Judgment

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3453/2002 

JINDAL STAINLESS LTD.& ANR. …Appellants  VS.  

STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. …Respondents  WITH  

C.A. NO. 6383-6421/1997, C.A. NO. 6422-6435/1997, C.A. NO. 6436/1997, C.A.  NO. 6437-6440/1997 , C.A. NO. 3381-3400/1998, C.A. NO. 4651/1998, C.A.  NO. 918/1999, C.A. NO. 2769/2000, C.A. NO. 4471/2000, C.A. NO. 3314/2001,  C.A. NO. 3454/2002, C.A. NO. 3455/2002, C.A. NO. 3456-3459/2002, C.A. NO.  3460/2002, C.A. NO. 3461/2002, C.A. NO. 3462-3463/2002, C.A. NO.  3464/2002, C.A. NO. 3465/2002, C.A. NO. 3466/2002, C.A. NO. 3467/2002,  C.A. NO. 3468/2002, C.A. NO. 3469/2002, C.A. NO. 3470/2002, C.A. NO.  3471/2002, C.A. NO. 4008/2002, C.A. NO. 5385/2002, C.A. NO. 5740/2002,  C.A. NO. 5858/2002, W.P.(C) NO. 512/2003, W.P.(C) NO. 574/2003, C.A. NO.  2608/2003, C.A. NO. 2633/2003, C.A. NO. 2637/2003, C.A. NO. 2638/2003,  C.A. NO. 3720-3722/2003, C.A. NO. 6331/2003, C.A. NO. 8241/2003, C.A. NO.  8242/2003, C.A. NO. 8243/2003, C.A. NO. 8244/2003, C.A. NO. 8245/2003,  C.A. NO. 8246/2003, C.A. NO. 8247/2003, C.A. NO. 8248/2003, C.A. NO.  8249/2003, C.A. NO. 8250/2003, C.A. NO. 8251/2003, C.A. NO. 8252/2003,  T.C.(C) NO. 13/2004, W.P.(C) NO. 66/2004, W.P.(C) NO. 221/2004, C.A. NO.  997-998/2004, C.A. NO. 3144/2004, C.A. NO. 3145/2004, C.A. NO. 3146/2004,  C.A. NO. 4953/2004, C.A. NO. 4954/2004, C.A. NO. 5139/2004, C.A. NO.  5141/2004, C.A. NO. 5142/2004, C.A. NO. 5143/2004, C.A. NO. 5144/2004,  C.A. NO. 5145/2004, C.A. NO. 5147/2004, C.A. NO. 5148/2004, C.A. NO.  5149/2004, C.A. NO. 5150/2004, C.A. NO. 5151/2004, C.A. NO. 5152/2004,  C.A. NO. 5153/2004, C.A. NO. 5154/2004, C.A. NO. 5155/2004, C.A. NO.  5156/2004, C.A. NO. 5157/2004, C.A. NO. 5158/2004, C.A. NO. 5159/2004,  C.A. NO. 5160/2004, C.A. NO. 5162/2004, C.A. NO. 5163/2004, C.A. NO.  5164/2004, C.A. NO. 5165/2004, C.A. NO. 5166/2004, C.A. NO. 5167/2004, 

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C.A. NO. 5168/2004, C.A. NO. 5169/2004, C.A. NO. 5170/2004, C.A. NO.  7658/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9479/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9496/2004, SLP(C). 9569/2004,  SLP(C) NO. 9832/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9883/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9885/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 9891/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9893/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9898/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9899/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9901/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9904/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9910/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9911/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9912/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9950/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9964/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9976/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9989/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9991/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9993/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9998/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9999/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10003/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10007/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10129/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10133/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10134/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10153/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10154/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10156/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10161/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10164/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10167/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10206/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10207/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10232/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10366/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10381/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10382/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10384/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10385/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10391/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10402/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10403/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10404/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10407/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10417/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10449/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10493/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10495/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10497/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10501/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10505/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10539/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10557/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10563/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10566/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10567/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10568/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10569/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10571/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10704/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10706/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10708/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10736/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10906/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10907/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10908/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10909/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10910/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10923/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10929/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10977/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11012/2004, SLP(C) NO.  11266/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11271/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11274/2004, SLP(C) NO.  11281/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11320/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11326/2004, SLP(C) NO.  11328/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11329/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11370/2004, SLP(C) NO.  14380/2005, SLP(C) NO. 1101/2007, SLP(C) NO. 1288/2007, SLP(C) NO.  6914/2007, SLP(C) NO. 9054/2007, SLP(C) NO. 10694/2007, SLP(C) NO.  12959/2007, SLP(C) NO. 13806/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14070/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14819/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14820/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14821/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14823/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14824/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14826/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14828/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14829/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14830/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14832/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14833/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14835/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14837/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14838/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14839/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14841/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14842/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14845/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14846/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14847/2007, SLP(C) NO. 15082-15085/2007, SLP(C)  NO. 15807/2007, SLP(C) NO. 16351/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17589/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17590/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17905/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17906/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17907/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17908/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17909/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17910/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17911/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17913/2007, SLP(C) NO. 

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17914/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17915/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17916/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17917/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17918/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17919/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17920/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17921/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17922/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17923/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17924/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17925/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17926/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17929/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17930/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17933/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17934/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17936/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17937/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17938/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17939/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17941/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17942/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17943/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17944/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17957/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17959/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17960/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17961/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17962/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17963/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17964/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17965/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17972/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17973/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17974/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17975/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17976/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17977/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17978/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17979/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17980/2007, SLP(C) NO.  17981/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17983/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17984/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18036/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18037/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18038/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18039/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18040/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18041/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18042/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18043/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18044/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18045/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18046/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18047/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18048/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18049/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18050/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18051/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18053/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18054/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18055/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18056/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18057/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18058/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18059/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18061/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18062/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18063/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18064/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18065/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18066/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18067/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18068/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18069/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18073/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18074/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18075/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18076/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18077/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18078/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18079/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18080/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18081/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18082/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18083/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18084/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18085/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18086/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18087/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18088/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18089/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18090/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18091/2007, SLP(C) NO.  18092/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19049/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19050/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19051/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19052/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19053/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19055/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19057/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19059/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19060/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19062/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19064/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19066/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19068/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19070/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19071/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19072/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19073/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19074/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19076/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19077/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19094/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19095/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19096/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19099/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19100/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19101/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19102/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19103/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19104/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19105/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19106/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19107/2007, SLP(C) NO. 

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19108/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19110/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19111/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19113/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19114/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19505/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19506/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19507/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19508/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19510/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19511/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19512/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19513/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19514/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19515/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19516/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19518/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19521/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19522/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19523-19528/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19529/2007, SLP(C)  NO. 19530/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19531/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19543-19547/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 20527/2007, SLP(C) NO. 20529/2007, SLP(C) NO. 20559/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 21841/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21843/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21844/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 21845/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21846/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21847/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 21848/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21849/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21851/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 21855/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21864/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21866/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 21867/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21871-21904/2007, SLP(C) NO.  21905/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21907/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21908/2007, SLP(C) NO.  21909/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21910/2007, SLP(C) NO. 22947/2007, SLP(C) NO.  22958/2007, SLP(C) NO. 24934-25066/2007, SLP(C) NO. 742/2008, SLP(C) NO.  746/2008, SLP(C) NO. 747/2008, SLP(C) NO. 3230/2008, SLP(C) NO. 3231/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 3233/2008, SLP(C) NO. 3234/2008, SLP(C) NO. 3236/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 3237/2008, SLP(C) NO. 3238-3262/2008, C.A. NO. 4715/2008, C.A. NO.  5041-5042/2008, SLP(C) NO. 5407/2008, SLP(C) NO. 5408/2008, SLP(C) NO.  6148-6152/2008, SLP(C) NO. 6831/2008, SLP(C) NO. 7914/2008, SLP(C) NO.  8053-8077/2008, SLP(C) NO. 8199/2008, SLP(C) NO. 9227/2008, SLP(C) NO.  12424-12425/2008, SLP(C) NO. 13327/2008, SLP(C) NO. 13889/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 14232-14252/2008, SLP(C) NO. 14454-14778/2008, SLP(C) NO.  14828/2008, SLP(C) NO. 14829/2008, SLP(C) NO. 14875/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15047/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15078/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15090/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15161/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15164/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15179/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15253/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15273/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15274/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15286-15287/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15288-15289/2008, S.L.P.(C)… /2008 CC NO.  15314 , SLP(C) NO. 15324/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15325/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15326/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15327/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15328/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15329/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15330/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15331/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15335/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15337/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15356/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15357/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15369/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15405/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15491/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15492/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15493/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15495/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15496/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15498/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15540/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15551/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15579/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15605/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15618/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15623/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15628/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15629/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15630/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15631/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15632/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15633/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15636/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15643/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15647/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15652/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15653/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15655/2008, SLP(C) NO. 

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15656/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15657/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15659/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15660/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15666/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15684/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15700/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15711/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15819/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15845/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15934/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16664/2008, SLP(C) NO.  16667/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16689/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16733/2008, SLP(C) NO.  16754/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16832/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16837/2008, SLP(C) NO.  16841/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16865/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16885/2008, SLP(C) NO.  16926/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16930/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17187/2008, SLP(C) NO.  17192/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17193/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17203/2008, SLP(C) NO.  17204/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17233/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17267/2008, SLP(C) NO.  17269/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17271/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17272/2008, SLP(C) NO.  17274/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17276/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17277/2008, SLP(C) NO.  17279/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17280/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17282/2008, SLP(C) NO.  17367/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17368/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17369/2008, SLP(C) NO.  17370/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17372/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17373/2008, SLP(C) NO.  17374/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17375/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17376/2008, SLP(C) NO.  17377/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17408/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17865/2008, SLP(C) NO.  17892/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18001/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18030/2008, SLP(C) NO.  18034/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18035/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18040/2008, SLP(C) NO.  18066-18067/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18344/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18346/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 18354/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18360-18364/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18379/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 18405/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18532/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18533/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 18582/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18684-18714/2008, SLP(C) NO.  18850/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18857/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18865/2008, SLP(C) NO.  18870/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18871/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19019/2008, SLP(C) NO.  19026/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19030/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19049/2008, SLP(C) NO.  19120/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19141/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19372/2008, SLP(C) NO.  19421/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19425/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19460/2008, SLP(C) NO.  19470/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19714/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19722/2008, SLP(C) NO.  19731/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19737/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19802/2008, SLP(C) NO.  19847/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19849/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19867/2008, SLP(C) NO.  19873/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19876/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19986/2008, SLP(C) NO.  20068/2008, SLP(C) NO. 20089/2008, SLP(C) NO. 20165/2008, SLP(C) NO.  20766/2008, SLP(C) NO. 20795/2008, SLP(C) NO. 21107/2008, SLP(C) NO.  21117-21125/2008, SLP(C) NO. 21127/2008, SLP(C) NO. 21506/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 21509/2008, SLP(C) NO. 21510/2008, SLP(C) NO. 21819/2008, SLP(C) NO.  22081/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22083/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22084/2008, SLP(C) NO.  22086/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22100-22101/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22195/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 22707/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22735/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22931/2008, SLP(C) NO.  23075/2008, SLP(C) NO. 23077/2008, SLP(C) NO. 23270/2008, SLP(C) NO.  23277/2008, SLP(C) NO. 23383/2008, SLP(C) NO. 23609/2008, SLP(C) NO.  23623/2008, SLP(C) NO. 25378/2008, SLP(C) NO. 25498/2008, SLP(C) NO.  26377/2008, SLP(C) NO. 26543/2008, SLP(C) NO. 26571/2008, SLP(C) NO. 

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26572/2008, SLP(C) NO. 26593/2008, SLP(C) NO. 26750/2008, SLP(C) NO.  26813/2008, SLP(C) NO. 26972/2008, SLP(C) NO. 27442-27444/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 27606/2008, SLP(C) NO. 27927/2008, SLP(C) NO. 29194/2008, SLP(C) NO.  29196/2008, SLP(C) NO. 29561-29570/2008, SLP(C) NO. 29763/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 29764/2008, SLP(C) NO. 30276/2008, SLP(C) NO. 30533/2008, SLP(C) NO.  30534-30540/2008, SLP(C) NO. 30542/2008, S.L.P.(C)… /2009 CC NO. 2867,  SLP(C) NO. 3276/2009, SLP(C) NO. 4720/2009, S.L.P.(C)… /2009 CC NO. 5143,  S.L.P.(C)… /2009 CC NO. 5311, SLP(C) NO. 5371/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5376/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 5381/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5383/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5384/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 5393/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5395/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5396/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5399/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5401/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5403/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5405/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5406/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5408/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5409/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5410/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5411/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5412/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5413/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5414/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5420/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5421/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5422/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5424/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5426/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5493-5494/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5495/2009, S.L.P.(C)… /2009 CC NO. 5803, SLP(C) NO. 5883/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6254/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6669/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6670/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6675/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6676/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6682/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6683/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6684/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6685/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6686/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6687/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6688/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6689/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6690/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6692/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6693/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6694/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6696/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6698/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6699/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6700/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6701/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6702/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6703/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6704/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6705/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6708/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6709/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6710/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6711/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6712/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6713/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6714-6715/2009, SLP(C) NO.  6953/2009, SLP(C) NO. 7345/2009, SLP(C) NO. 8244/2009, SLP(C) NO.  9548/2009, SLP(C) NO. 9699/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10040/2009, SLP(C) NO.  10041/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10042/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10045/2009, SLP(C) NO.  10047/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10048/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10049/2009, SLP(C) NO.  10050/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10051/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10053-10054/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 10192/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10279/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10952/2009, SLP(C) NO.  10954-10956/2009, SLP(C) NO. 11042/2009, SLP(C) NO. 11122/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 11603-11611/2009, SLP(C) NO. 11646/2009, SLP(C) NO. 12948/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 13270-13274/2009, SLP(C) NO. 13483/2009, SLP(C) NO.  13496/2009, SLP(C) NO. 13517/2009, SLP(C) NO. 13611-13612/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 14429/2009, SLP(C) NO. 14484/2009, SLP(C) NO. 14488/2009, SLP(C) NO.  14623/2009, SLP(C) NO. 14856/2009, SLP(C) NO. 14949/2009, SLP(C) NO.  15723/2009, SLP(C) NO. 16253/2009, SLP(C) NO. 16757-16760/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 16784/2009, SLP(C) NO. 16789/2009, SLP(C) NO. 16888-16898/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 17332-17333/2009, SLP(C) NO. 17394-17396/2009, SLP(C) NO. 

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17488/2009, SLP(C) NO. 17490/2009, SLP(C) NO. 17491/2009, SLP(C) NO.  17492-17498/2009, SLP(C) NO. 17722/2009, SLP(C) NO. 17731/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 17744/2009, SLP(C) NO. 19695/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22293/2009, SLP(C) NO.  22295/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22302/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22303/2009, SLP(C) NO.  22304/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22306/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22307/2009, SLP(C) NO.  22308/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22309/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22310/2009, SLP(C) NO.  22311/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22312/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22313/2009, SLP(C) NO.  22316/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22317/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22318/2009, SLP(C) NO.  22320/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22321/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22322/2009, SLP(C) NO.  22323/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22324/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22325/2009, SLP(C) NO.  22408/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22425/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22428/2009, SLP(C) NO.  23990/2009, SLP(C) NO. 24149/2009, SLP(C) NO. 24430/2009, SLP(C) NO.  24822/2009, SLP(C) NO. 25157/2009, SLP(C) NO. 25390/2009, SLP(C) NO.  25399-25400/2009, SLP(C) NO. 25467/2009, SLP(C) NO. 25470/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 25474/2009, SLP(C) NO. 25753/2009, SLP(C) NO. 25797/2009, SLP(C) NO.  26116/2009, SLP(C) NO. 26236/2009, SLP(C) NO. 26509/2009, SLP(C) NO.  27883/2009, SLP(C) NO. 28509/2009, SLP(C) NO. 28583/2009, SLP(C) NO.  28696/2009, SLP(C) NO. 28775/2009, SLP(C) NO. 29597/2009, SLP(C) NO.  29868/2009, SLP(C) NO. 30383/2009, SLP(C) NO. 30746-30845/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 30847/2009, SLP(C) NO. 31410/2009, SLP(C) NO. 31411/2009, SLP(C) NO.  31412/2009, SLP(C) NO. 33176/2009, SLP(C) NO. 33663-33665/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 33672/2009, SLP(C) NO. 34253/2009, SLP(C) NO. 34859/2009, SLP(C) NO.  35038/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35585/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35587/2009, SLP(C) NO.  35740/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35742/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35743-35746/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 35747/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35749/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35750/2009, SLP(C) NO.  35751/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35752/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35753/2009, SLP(C) NO.  35754/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35755/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35756/2009, SLP(C) NO.  35757/2009, SLP(C) NO. 36193/2009, SLP(C) NO. 36196/2009, SLP(C) NO.  36219/2009, SLP(C) NO. 36271/2009, W.P.(C) NO. 11/2010, W.P.(C) NO.  42/2010, W.P.(C) NO. 43/2010, W.P.(C) NO. 44/2010, W.P.(C) NO. 46/2010,  W.P.(C) NO. 48/2010, W.P.(C) NO. 63/2010, W.P.(C) NO. 71/2010, SLP(C) NO.  104/2010, SLP(C) NO. 245/2010, SLP(C) NO. 247/2010, SLP(C) NO. 248/2010,  S.L.P.(C)… /2010 CC NO. 886, S.L.P.(C)… /2010 CC NO. 1082, SLP(C) NO.  1820/2010, SLP(C) NO. 1876/2010, SLP(C) NO. 2459/2010, SLP(C) NO.  3387/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4102/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4362/2010, SLP(C) NO.  4388/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4389/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4390/2010, SLP(C) NO.  4511/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4572/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4720/2010, SLP(C) NO.  5151/2010, SLP(C) NO. 5308/2010, SLP(C) NO. 5309/2010, C.A. NO. 5343- 5344/2010, SLP(C) NO. 6037/2010, SLP(C) NO. 6723/2010, SLP(C) NO.  6762/2010, SLP(C) NO. 6763/2010, SLP(C) NO. 6765/2010, SLP(C) NO.  6770/2010, SLP(C) NO. 6811/2010, SLP(C) NO. 7356/2010, SLP(C) NO.  7426/2010, SLP(C) NO. 7776/2010, SLP(C) NO. 7929/2010, SLP(C) NO.  9022/2010, SLP(C) NO. 9077/2010, SLP(C) NO. 9702/2010, SLP(C) NO. 

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9723/2010, SLP(C) NO. 10361/2010, SLP(C) NO. 11419/2010, SLP(C) NO.  11423/2010, SLP(C) NO. 12690/2010, SLP(C) NO. 14845/2010, SLP(C) NO.  14886/2010, SLP(C) NO. 15015/2010, SLP(C) NO. 15903/2010, SLP(C) NO.  16694/2010, SLP(C) NO. 16720/2010, SLP(C) NO. 18318/2010, SLP(C) NO.  18834/2010, SLP(C) NO. 19194/2010, SLP(C) NO. 19199/2010, SLP(C) NO.  19217/2010, SLP(C) NO. 22327/2010, SLP(C) NO. 22520/2010, SLP(C) NO.  23836/2010, SLP(C) NO. 29578/2010, SLP(C) NO. 36486/2010, W.P.(C) NO.  31/2011, W.P.(C) NO. 497/2011, C.A. NO. 905/2011, SLP(C) NO. 1308/2011,  C.A. NO. 2041/2011, C.A. NO. 2042/2011, S.L.P.(C)… /2011 CC NO. 2103,  SLP(C) NO. 3433/2011, SLP(C) NO. 4730/2011, SLP(C) NO. 4743/2011, SLP(C)  NO. 4747/2011, SLP(C) NO. 4750/2011, SLP(C) NO. 5094/2011, SLP(C) NO.  5105/2011, SLP(C) NO. 5106/2011, SLP(C) NO. 5110/2011, SLP(C) NO.  5112/2011, SLP(C) NO. 6351/2011, SLP(C) NO. 6492/2011, SLP(C) NO.  8571/2011, SLP(C) NO. 9758/2011, C.A. NO. 9900-9903/2011, SLP(C) NO.  12605/2011, SLP(C) NO. 13451/2011, SLP(C) NO. 13525/2011, SLP(C) NO.  13526/2011, SLP(C) NO. 14144/2011, SLP(C) NO. 14269/2011, SLP(C) NO.  14342/2011, SLP(C) NO. 18858/2011, SLP(C) NO. 18859/2011, SLP(C) NO.  18862/2011, SLP(C) NO. 18863/2011, SLP(C) NO. 18864/2011, SLP(C) NO.  33344/2011, W.P.(C) NO. 278/2012, W.P.(C) NO. 290/2012, C.A. NO.  4210/2012, C.A. NO. 5860/2012, C.A. NO. 5861/2012, C.A. NO. 8275/2012,  C.A. NO. 8278/2012, C.A. NO. 8280/2012, C.A. NO. 8283/2012, C.A. NO.  8284/2012, C.A. NO. 8286/2012, C.A. NO. 8290/2012, C.A. NO. 8292/2012,  C.A. NO. 8294/2012, C.A. NO. 8295/2012, C.A. NO. 8296/2012, C.A. NO.  8297/2012, C.A. NO. 8298/2012, C.A. NO. 8299/2012, C.A. NO. 8300/2012,  C.A. NO. 8301/2012, C.A. NO. 8302/2012, C.A. NO. 8303/2012, C.A. NO.  8304/2012, C.A. NO. 8305/2012, C.A. NO. 8306/2012, C.A. NO. 8307/2012,  C.A. NO. 8308/2012, C.A. NO. 8309/2012, C.A. NO. 8311/2012, C.A. NO.  8312/2012, C.A. NO. 8313/2012, C.A. NO. 8314/2012, C.A. NO. 8315/2012,  C.A. NO. 8316/2012, SLP(C) NO. 8333/2012, C.A. NO. 8734/2012, C.A. NO.  8735/2012, C.A. NO. 8736/2012, C.A. NO. 8737/2012, C.A. NO. 8738/2012,  C.A. NO. 8739/2012, C.A. NO. 8740/2012, C.A. NO. 8741/2012, C.A. NO.  8744/2012, C.A. NO. 8745/2012, C.A. NO. 8832/2012, C.A. NO. 8833/2012,  C.A. NO. 8834/2012, C.A. NO. 8836/2012, C.A. NO. 8837/2012, C.A. NO.  8839/2012, C.A. NO. 8840/2012, C.A. NO. 8841/2012, C.A. NO. 8842/2012,  C.A. NO. 8843/2012, C.A. NO. 8844/2012, C.A. NO. 8845/2012, C.A. NO.  8846/2012, C.A. NO. 9148/2012, C.A. NO. 9149/2012, C.A. NO. 9150/2012,  C.A. NO. 9151/2012, C.A. NO. 9152/2012, C.A. NO. 9153/2012, C.A. NO.  9154/2012, C.A. NO. 9155/2012, C.A. NO. 9156/2012, C.A. NO. 9157/2012,  C.A. NO. 9158/2012, C.A. NO. 9159/2012, C.A. NO. 9160/2012, C.A. NO.  9161/2012, C.A. NO. 9162/2012, C.A. NO. 9163/2012, C.A. NO. 9164/2012,  C.A. NO. 9165/2012, C.A. NO. 9166/2012, C.A. NO. 9167/2012, C.A. NO.  9168/2012, C.A. NO. 9169/2012, C.A. NO. 9170/2012, C.A. NO. 9292/2012,  C.A. NO. 9293/2012, SLP(C) NO. 16535-16536/2012, SLP(C) NO. 16538/2012, 

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SLP(C) NO. 18602/2012, SLP(C) NO. 28173/2012, SLP(C) NO. 33954/2012,  SLP(C) NO. 36187/2012, SLP(C) NO. 37455/2012, SLP(C) NO. 37680/2012,  SLP(C) NO. 37708-37709/2012, SLP(C) NO. 37712/2012, SLP(C) NO.  37728/2012, SLP(C) NO. 38304/2012, SLP(C) NO. 38919/2012, SLP(C) NO.  39998/2012, SLP(C) NO. 40146/2012, SLP(C) NO. 40147/2012, T.C.(C) NO.  149/2013, SLP(C) NO. 449/2013, C.A. NO. 539/2013, C.A. NO. 540/2013, C.A.  NO. 541/2013, C.A. NO. 542/2013, C.A. NO. 543/2013, C.A. NO. 544/2013,  C.A. NO. 545/2013, C.A. NO. 546/2013, C.A. NO. 547/2013, C.A. NO.  548/2013, SLP(C) NO. 1426/2013, SLP(C) NO. 8939/2013, SLP(C) NO.  9844/2013, SLP(C) NO. 10466/2013, SLP(C) NO. 10516/2013, SLP(C) NO.  10879/2013, SLP(C) NO. 11060/2013, SLP(C) NO. 16744-16746/2013, SLP(C)  NO. 16867/2013, SLP(C) NO. 16869/2013, SLP(C) NO. 16870/2013, SLP(C) NO.  27001-27002/2013, SLP(C) NO. 30986/2013, SLP(C) NO. 32256/2013, SLP(C)  NO. 33600/2013, C.A. NO. 1838/2014, C.A. NO. 9216/2014, C.A. NO.  9214/2014, SLP(C) NO. 29119/2014, SLP(C) NO. 208/2015, SLP(C) NO.  212/2015, SLP(C) NO. 315-317/2015, SLP(C) NO. 320/2015, SLP(C) NO.  336/2015, SLP(C) NO. 352/2015, SLP(C) NO. 376/2015, SLP(C) NO. 411- 421/2015, SLP(C) NO. 380/2015, SLP(C) NO. 437/2015, SLP(C) NO. 445/2015,  SLP(C) NO. 457/2015, SLP(C) NO. 508/2015, SLP(C) NO. 510/2015, SLP(C) NO.  567/2015, SLP(C) NO. 561-562/2015, SLP(C) NO. 585/2015, SLP(C) NO.  621/2015, SLP(C) NO. 638/2015, SLP(C) NO. 641/2015, SLP(C) NO. 661/2015,  SLP(C) NO. 664/2015, SLP(C) NO. 662/2015, SLP(C) NO. 669/2015, SLP(C) NO.  668/2015, SLP(C) NO. 671/2015, SLP(C) NO. 672/2015, SLP(C) NO. 675/2015,  SLP(C) NO. 674/2015, SLP(C) NO. 683/2015, SLP(C) NO. 690-691/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 684-686/2015, SLP(C) NO. 693-694/2015, SLP(C) NO. 712/2015, SLP(C) NO.  1270/2015, SLP(C) NO. 1424/2015, SLP(C) NO. 1596/2015, SLP(C) NO.  1631/2015, SLP(C) NO. 1714/2015, SLP(C) NO. 1851-1852/2015, SLP(C) NO.  1943-2001/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2038/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2054/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2063-2065/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2081/2015, SLP(C) NO. 91/2015, SLP(C) NO.  4557/2015, SLP(C) NO. 4581/2015, SLP(C) NO. 4657/2015, SLP(C) NO.  5046/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5107/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5131/2015, SLP(C) NO.  5143/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5375/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5447/2015, SLP(C) NO.  5610/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5966/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6086/2015, SLP(C) NO.  6143/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6158/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6240-6243/2015, SLP(C) NO.  6565/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6575/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6631/2015, SLP(C) NO.  4600/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5007/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6728/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6754- 6755/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6823/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6907/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6909- 6910/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6939/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6956/2015, SLP(C) NO.  4386/2015, SLP(C) NO. 7319/2015, SLP(C) NO. 7957-7958/2015, SLP(C) NO.  8089/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2483/2015, SLP(C) NO. 8248/2015, SLP(C) NO.  8325/2015, SLP(C) NO. 8350-8351/2015, SLP(C) NO. 8527/2015, SLP(C) NO.  9585/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11830/2015, SLP(C) NO. 8798/2015, SLP(C) NO.  9584/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5311-5329/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11204-11205/2015, SLP(C) 

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  1. 9164/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9167/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9176/2015, SLP(C) NO.  9181/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11832/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9188/2015, SLP(C) NO.  9348/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5908/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9386/2015, SLP(C) NO.  9484/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9582/2015, SLP(C) NO. 7874/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11080- 

11086/2015, SLP(C) NO. 12839/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11156/2015, SLP(C) NO.  11170/2015, SLP(C) NO. 12844/2015, SLP(C) NO. 8162/2015, SLP(C) NO.  11484/2015, SLP(C) NO. 12847/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11582/2015, SLP(C) NO.  11592/2015, SLP(C) NO. 13200/2015, SLP(C) NO. 13201/2015, SLP(C) NO. 4219- 

4227/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2966-2999/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11888/2015, SLP(C) NO.  11203/2015, SLP(C) NO. 14828/2015, SLP(C) NO. 14854/2015, SLP(C) NO.  15856/2015, SLP(C) NO. 15857/2015, SLP(C) NO. 15858/2015, SLP(C) NO.  11458-11465/2015, SLP(C) NO. 18213/2015, SLP(C) NO. 18333/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 16312/2015, SLP(C) NO. 18334/2015, SLP(C) NO. 18335/2015, SLP(C) NO.  15855/2015, SLP(C) NO. 18338/2015, SLP(C) NO. 18184/2015, SLP(C) NO.  18179/2015, C.A. NO. 1956/2003, SLP(C) NO. 8775-8777/2015, SLP(C) NO.  5303/2015, SLP(C) NO. 16853/2015, SLP(C) NO. 21720/2015, SLP(C) NO. 23673- 23674/2015, SLP(C) NO. 23764/2015, SLP(C) NO. 23765/2015, SLP(C) NO.  15353/2015, SLP(C) NO. 22349/2015, SLP(C) NO. 21718/2015, SLP(C) NO.  24547/2015, SLP(C) NO. 23757/2015, C.A. NO. 8240/2015, SLP(C) NO.  26751/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9117/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2214/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2531/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2289/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2530/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2392/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2499/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2502/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2538- 2543/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2426/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2358/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2401/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2389/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2485/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2495/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3163-3164/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3666/2015, SLP(C) NO.  3679/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3723/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3321/2015, SLP(C) NO. 4198- 

4199/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3325/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3466/2015, SLP(C) NO.  3635/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3318/2015, SLP(C) NO. 30396/2015, C.A. NO. 110/2016,  C.A. NO. 109/2016, C.A. NO. 583/2016, SLP(C) NO. 4945/2016, SLP(C) NO.  8253/2016, SLP(C) NO. 8204/2008, C.A. NO. 3925/2016, SLP(C) NO. 2057/2016,  SLP(C) NO. 86/2016, SLP(C) NO. 72/2016, C.A. NO. 5534/2016, C.A. NO.  5536/2016, C.A. NO. 5137/2016, SLP(C) NO. 33923/2012, C.A. NO. 5537/2016,  SLP(C) NO. 16116/2009, SLP(C) NO. 30594/2009, SLP(C) NO. 2636/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 2680/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2952/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2641/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2588/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2928/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2737/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2682/2015, SLP(C) NO. 8197-8198/2015, SLP(C) NO. 4197/2015, C.A. NO.  5538/2016, C.A. NO. 5533/2016, SLP(C) NO. 14539-14541/2016, SLP(C) NO.  16820/2016, C.A. NO. 4642-4643/2016  

ORDER 

 By majority the Court answers the reference in the following terms: 10  

Page 10 

  1. Taxes simpliciter are not within the contemplation of Part XIII of the  Constitution of India. The word ‘Free’ used in Article 301 does not mean  “free from taxation”.  
  2. Only such taxes as are discriminatory in nature are prohibited by  Article 304(a). It follows that levy of a non-discriminatory tax would not  constitute an infraction of Article 301.  
  3. Clauses (a) and (b) of Article 304 have to be read disjunctively.  
  4. A levy that violates 304(a) cannot be saved even if the procedure  under Article 304(b) or the proviso there under is satisfied.  
  5. The compensatory tax theory evolved in Automobile Transport case  and subsequently modified in Jindal’s case has no juristic basis and is  therefore rejected. 
  6. Decisions of this Court in Atiabari, Automobile Transport and Jindal  cases (supra) and all other judgments that follow these  pronouncements are to the extent of such reliance over ruled. 
  7. A tax on entry of goods into a local area for use, sale or consumption  therein is permissible although similar goods are not produced within  the taxing state.  
  8. Article 304 (a) frowns upon discrimination (of a hostile nature in the  protectionist sense) and not on mere differentiation. Therefore,  incentives, set-offs etc. granted to a specified class of dealers for a  limited period of time in a non-hostile fashion with a view to developing  economically backward areas would not violate Article 304(a). The  question whether the levies in the present case indeed satisfy this test is  left to be determined by the regular benches hearing the matters.  
  9. States are well within their right to design their fiscal legislations to  ensure that the tax burden on goods imported from other States and  goods produced within the State fall equally. Such measures if taken  would not contravene Article 304(a) of the Constitution. The question  whether the levies in the present case indeed satisfy this test is left to be  determined by the regular benches hearing the matters. 

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  1. The questions whether the entire State can be notified as a local area  and whether entry tax can be levied on goods entering the landmass  of India from another country are left open to be determined in  appropriate proceedings.  

.……………..………….…..…CJI.  

(T.S. THAKUR) 

…………………………….…..…J.  

 (A.K. SIKRI) 

…………………………….…..…J.  

 (S.A. BOBDE) 

…………………………….…..…J.  

 (SHIVA KIRTI SINGH) 

…………………………….…..…J.  

 (N.V. RAMANA) 

…………………………….…..…J.  

 (R. BANUMATHI) 

  

…………………………….…..…J.  

 (A.M. KHANWILKAR)  

New Delhi;  

November 11, 2016 

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 R E P O R T A B L E 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA  

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION  

CIVIL APPEAL NO.3453 OF 2002 

Jindal Stainless Ltd. & Anr. …Appellant(s)    

Versus 

State of Haryana & Ors. …Respondent(s)  

WITH 

C.A. NO. 6383-6421/1997, C.A. NO. 6422-6435/1997, C.A. NO. 6436/1997,  C.A. NO. 6437-6440/1997 , C.A. NO. 3381-3400/1998, C.A. NO.  4651/1998, C.A. NO. 918/1999, C.A. NO. 2769/2000, C.A. NO. 4471/2000,  C.A. NO. 3314/2001, C.A. NO. 3454/2002, C.A. NO. 3455/2002, C.A. NO.  3456-3459/2002, C.A. NO. 3460/2002, C.A. NO. 3461/2002, C.A. NO.  3462-3463/2002, C.A. NO. 3464/2002, C.A. NO. 3465/2002, C.A. NO.  3466/2002, C.A. NO. 3467/2002, C.A. NO. 3468/2002, C.A. NO.  3469/2002, C.A. NO. 3470/2002, C.A. NO. 3471/2002, C.A. NO.  4008/2002, C.A. NO. 5385/2002, C.A. NO. 5740/2002, C.A. NO.  5858/2002, W.P.(C) NO. 512/2003, W.P.(C) NO. 574/2003, C.A. NO.  2608/2003, C.A. NO. 2633/2003, C.A. NO. 2637/2003, C.A. NO.  2638/2003, C.A. NO. 3720-3722/2003, C.A. NO. 6331/2003, C.A. NO.  8241/2003, C.A. NO. 8242/2003, C.A. NO. 8243/2003, C.A. NO.  8244/2003, C.A. NO. 8245/2003, C.A. NO. 8246/2003, C.A. NO.  8247/2003, C.A. NO. 8248/2003, C.A. NO. 8249/2003, C.A. NO.  8250/2003, C.A. NO. 8251/2003, C.A. NO. 8252/2003, T.C.(C) NO.  13/2004, W.P.(C) NO. 66/2004, W.P.(C) NO. 221/2004, C.A. NO. 997- 998/2004, C.A. NO. 3144/2004, C.A. NO. 3145/2004, C.A. NO. 3146/2004,  C.A. NO. 4953/2004, C.A. NO. 4954/2004, C.A. NO. 5139/2004, C.A. NO.  5141/2004, C.A. NO. 5142/2004, C.A. NO. 5143/2004, C.A. NO.  5144/2004, C.A. NO. 5145/2004, C.A. NO. 5147/2004, C.A. NO.  5148/2004, C.A. NO. 5149/2004, C.A. NO. 5150/2004, C.A. NO.  5151/2004, C.A. NO. 5152/2004, C.A. NO. 5153/2004, C.A. NO.  5154/2004, C.A. NO. 5155/2004, C.A. NO. 5156/2004, C.A. NO.  5157/2004, C.A. NO. 5158/2004, C.A. NO. 5159/2004, C.A. NO.  5160/2004, C.A. NO. 5162/2004, C.A. NO. 5163/2004, C.A. NO. 

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5164/2004, C.A. NO. 5165/2004, C.A. NO. 5166/2004, C.A. NO.  5167/2004, C.A. NO. 5168/2004, C.A. NO. 5169/2004, C.A. NO.  5170/2004, C.A. NO. 7658/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9479/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9496/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9569/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9832/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9883/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9885/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9891/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9893/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9898/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9899/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9901/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9904/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9910/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9911/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9912/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9950/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9964/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9976/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9989/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9991/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9993/2004, SLP(C) NO. 9998/2004, SLP(C) NO.  9999/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10003/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10007/2004, SLP(C) NO.  10129/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10133/2004, SLP(CCJI) NO. 10134/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10153/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10154/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10156/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10161/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10164/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10167/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10206/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10207/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10232/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10366/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10381/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10382/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10384/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10385/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10391/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10402/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10403/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10404/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10407/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10417/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10449/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10493/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10495/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10497/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10501/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10505/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10539/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10557/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10563/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10566/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10567/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10568/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10569/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10571/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10704/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10706/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10708/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10736/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10906/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10907/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10908/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10909/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10910/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10923/2004, SLP(C) NO. 10929/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 10977/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11012/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11266/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 11271/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11274/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11281/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 11320/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11326/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11328/2004, SLP(C)  NO. 11329/2004, SLP(C) NO. 11370/2004, SLP(C) NO. 14380/2005, SLP(C)  NO. 1101/2007, SLP(C) NO. 1288/2007, SLP(C) NO. 6914/2007, SLP(C) NO.  9054/2007, SLP(C) NO. 10694/2007, SLP(C) NO. 12959/2007, SLP(C) NO.  13806/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14070/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14819/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14820/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14821/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14823/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14824/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14826/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14828/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14829/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14830/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14832/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14833/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14835/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14837/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14838/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14839/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14841/2007, SLP(C) NO.  14842/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14845/2007, SLP(C) NO. 14846/2007, SLP(C) NO. 

14  

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14847/2007, SLP(C) NO. 15082-15085/2007, SLP(C) NO. 15807/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 16351/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17589/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17590/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17905/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17906/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17907/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17908/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17909/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17910/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17911/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17913/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17914/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17915/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17916/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17917/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17918/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17919/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17920/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17921/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17922/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17923/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17924/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17925/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17926/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17929/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17930/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17933/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17934/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17936/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17937/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17938/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17939/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17941/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17942/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17943/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17944/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17957/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17959/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17960/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17961/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17962/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17963/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17964/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17965/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17972/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17973/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17974/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17975/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17976/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17977/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17978/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17979/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17980/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17981/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 17983/2007, SLP(C) NO. 17984/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18036/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18037/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18038/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18039/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18040/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18041/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18042/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18043/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18044/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18045/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18046/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18047/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18048/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18049/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18050/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18051/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18053/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18054/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18055/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18056/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18057/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18058/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18059/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18061/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18062/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18063/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18064/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18065/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18066/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18067/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18068/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18069/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18073/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18074/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18075/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18076/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18077/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18078/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18079/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18080/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18081/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18082/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18083/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18084/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18085/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18086/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18087/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18088/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18089/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 18090/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18091/2007, SLP(C) NO. 18092/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19049/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19050/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19051/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19052/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19053/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19055/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19057/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19059/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19060/2007, 

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SLP(C) NO. 19062/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19064/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19066/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19068/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19070/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19071/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19072/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19073/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19074/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19076/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19077/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19094/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19095/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19096/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19099/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19100/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19101/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19102/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19103/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19104/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19105/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19106/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19107/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19108/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19110/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19111/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19113/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19114/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19505/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19506/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19507/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19508/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19510/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19511/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19512/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19513/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19514/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19515/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19516/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19518/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19521/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19522/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 19523-19528/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19529/2007, SLP(C) NO.  19530/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19531/2007, SLP(C) NO. 19543-19547/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 20527/2007, SLP(C) NO. 20529/2007, SLP(C) NO. 20559/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 21841/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21843/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21844/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 21845/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21846/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21847/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 21848/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21849/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21851/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 21855/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21864/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21866/2007,  SLP(C) NO. 21867/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21871-21904/2007, SLP(C) NO.  21905/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21907/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21908/2007, SLP(C) NO.  21909/2007, SLP(C) NO. 21910/2007, SLP(C) NO. 22947/2007, SLP(C) NO.  22958/2007, SLP(C) NO. 24934-25066/2007, SLP(C) NO. 742/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 746/2008, SLP(C) NO. 747/2008, SLP(C) NO. 3230/2008, SLP(C) NO.  3231/2008, SLP(C) NO. 3233/2008, SLP(C) NO. 3234/2008, SLP(C) NO.  3236/2008, SLP(C) NO. 3237/2008, SLP(C) NO. 3238-3262/2008, C.A. NO.  4715/2008, C.A. NO. 5041-5042/2008, SLP(C) NO. 5407/2008, SLP(C) NO.  5408/2008, SLP(C) NO. 6148-6152/2008, SLP(C) NO. 6831/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 7914/2008, SLP(C) NO. 8053-8077/2008, SLP(C) NO. 8199/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 9227/2008, SLP(C) NO. 12424-12425/2008, SLP(C) NO.  13327/2008, SLP(C) NO. 13889/2008, SLP(C) NO. 14232-14252/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 14454-14778/2008, SLP(C) NO. 14828/2008, SLP(C) NO.  14829/2008, SLP(C) NO. 14875/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15047/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15078/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15090/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15161/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15164/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15179/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15253/2008, SLP(C) NO.  15273/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15274/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15286-15287/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 15288-15289/2008, S.L.P.(C)… /2008 CC NO. 15314 , SLP(C)  NO. 15324/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15325/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15326/2008, SLP(C) 

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  1. 15327/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15328/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15329/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15330/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15331/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15335/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15337/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15356/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15357/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15369/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15405/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15491/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15492/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15493/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15495/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15496/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15498/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15540/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15551/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15579/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15605/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15618/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15623/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15628/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15629/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15630/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15631/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15632/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15633/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15636/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15643/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15647/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15652/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15653/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15655/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15656/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15657/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15659/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15660/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15666/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15684/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15700/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15711/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15819/2008, SLP(C) NO. 15845/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 15934/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16664/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16667/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 16689/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16733/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16754/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 16832/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16837/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16841/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 16865/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16885/2008, SLP(C) NO. 16926/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 16930/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17187/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17192/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 17193/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17203/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17204/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 17233/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17267/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17269/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 17271/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17272/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17274/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 17276/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17277/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17279/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 17280/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17282/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17367/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 17368/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17369/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17370/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 17372/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17373/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17374/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 17375/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17376/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17377/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 17408/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17865/2008, SLP(C) NO. 17892/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 18001/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18030/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18034/2008, SLP(C)  NO. 18035/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18040/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18066-18067/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 18344/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18346/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18354/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 18360-18364/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18379/2008, SLP(C) NO.  18405/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18532/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18533/2008, SLP(C) NO.  18582/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18684-18714/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18850/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 18857/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18865/2008, SLP(C) NO. 18870/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 18871/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19019/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19026/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 19030/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19049/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19120/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 19141/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19372/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19421/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 19425/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19460/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19470/2008, 

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SLP(C) NO. 19714/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19722/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19731/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 19737/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19802/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19847/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 19849/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19867/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19873/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 19876/2008, SLP(C) NO. 19986/2008, SLP(C) NO. 20068/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 20089/2008, SLP(C) NO. 20165/2008, SLP(C) NO. 20766/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 20795/2008, SLP(C) NO. 21107/2008, SLP(C) NO. 21117- 

21125/2008, SLP(C) NO. 21127/2008, SLP(C) NO. 21506/2008, SLP(C) NO.  21509/2008, SLP(C) NO. 21510/2008, SLP(C) NO. 21819/2008, SLP(C) NO.  22081/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22083/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22084/2008, SLP(C) NO.  22086/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22100-22101/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22195/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 22707/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22735/2008, SLP(C) NO. 22931/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 23075/2008, SLP(C) NO. 23077/2008, SLP(C) NO. 23270/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 23277/2008, SLP(C) NO. 23383/2008, SLP(C) NO. 23609/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 23623/2008, SLP(C) NO. 25378/2008, SLP(C) NO. 25498/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 26377/2008, SLP(C) NO. 26543/2008, SLP(C) NO. 26571/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 26572/2008, SLP(C) NO. 26593/2008, SLP(C) NO. 26750/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 26813/2008, SLP(C) NO. 26972/2008, SLP(C) NO. 27442- 27444/2008, SLP(C) NO. 27606/2008, SLP(C) NO. 27927/2008, SLP(C) NO.  29194/2008, SLP(C) NO. 29196/2008, SLP(C) NO. 29561-29570/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 29763/2008, SLP(C) NO. 29764/2008, SLP(C) NO. 30276/2008,  SLP(C) NO. 30533/2008, SLP(C) NO. 30534-30540/2008, SLP(C) NO.  30542/2008, S.L.P.(C)… /2009 CC NO. 2867, SLP(C) NO. 3276/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 4720/2009, S.L.P.(C)… /2009 CC NO. 5143, S.L.P.(C)… /2009 CC NO.  5311, SLP(C) NO. 5371/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5376/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5381/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5383/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5384/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5393/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5395/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5396/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5399/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5401/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5403/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5405/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5406/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5408/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5409/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5410/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5411/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5412/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5413/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5414/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5420/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5421/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5422/2009, SLP(C) NO.  5424/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5426/2009, SLP(C) NO. 5493-5494/2009, SLP(C)  NO. 5495/2009, S.L.P.(C)… /2009 CC NO. 5803, SLP(C) NO. 5883/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 6254/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6669/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6670/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 6675/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6676/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6682/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 6683/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6684/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6685/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 6686/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6687/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6688/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 6689/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6690/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6692/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 6693/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6694/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6696/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 6698/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6699/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6700/2009, 

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SLP(C) NO. 6701/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6702/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6703/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 6704/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6705/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6708/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 6709/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6710/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6711/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 6712/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6713/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6714- 

6715/2009, SLP(C) NO. 6953/2009, SLP(C) NO. 7345/2009, SLP(C) NO.  8244/2009, SLP(C) NO. 9548/2009, SLP(C) NO. 9699/2009, SLP(C) NO.  10040/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10041/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10042/2009, SLP(C) NO.  10045/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10047/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10048/2009, SLP(C) NO.  10049/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10050/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10051/2009, SLP(C) NO.  10053-10054/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10192/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10279/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 10952/2009, SLP(C) NO. 10954-10956/2009, SLP(C) NO.  11042/2009, SLP(C) NO. 11122/2009, SLP(C) NO. 11603-11611/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 11646/2009, SLP(C) NO. 12948/2009, SLP(C) NO. 13270- 13274/2009, SLP(C) NO. 13483/2009, SLP(C) NO. 13496/2009, SLP(C) NO.  13517/2009, SLP(C) NO. 13611-13612/2009, SLP(C) NO. 14429/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 14484/2009, SLP(C) NO. 14488/2009, SLP(C) NO. 14623/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 14856/2009, SLP(C) NO. 14949/2009, SLP(C) NO. 15723/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 16253/2009, SLP(C) NO. 16757-16760/2009, SLP(C) NO.  16784/2009, SLP(C) NO. 16789/2009, SLP(C) NO. 16888-16898/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 17332-17333/2009, SLP(C) NO. 17394-17396/2009, SLP(C) NO.  17488/2009, SLP(C) NO. 17490/2009, SLP(C) NO. 17491/2009, SLP(C) NO.  17492-17498/2009, SLP(C) NO. 17722/2009, SLP(C) NO. 17731/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 17744/2009, SLP(C) NO. 19695/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22293/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 22295/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22302/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22303/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 22304/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22306/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22307/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 22308/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22309/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22310/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 22311/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22312/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22313/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 22316/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22317/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22318/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 22320/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22321/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22322/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 22323/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22324/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22325/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 22408/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22425/2009, SLP(C) NO. 22428/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 23990/2009, SLP(C) NO. 24149/2009, SLP(C) NO. 24430/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 24822/2009, SLP(C) NO. 25157/2009, SLP(C) NO. 25390/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 25399-25400/2009, SLP(C) NO. 25467/2009, SLP(C) NO.  25470/2009, SLP(C) NO. 25474/2009, SLP(C) NO. 25753/2009, SLP(C) NO.  25797/2009, SLP(C) NO. 26116/2009, SLP(C) NO. 26236/2009, SLP(C) NO.  26509/2009, SLP(C) NO. 27883/2009, SLP(C) NO. 28509/2009, SLP(C) NO.  28583/2009, SLP(C) NO. 28696/2009, SLP(C) NO. 28775/2009, SLP(C) NO.  29597/2009, SLP(C) NO. 29868/2009, SLP(C) NO. 30383/2009, SLP(C) NO.  30746-30845/2009, SLP(C) NO. 30847/2009, SLP(C) NO. 31410/2009, 

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SLP(C) NO. 31411/2009, SLP(C) NO. 31412/2009, SLP(C) NO. 33176/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 33663-33665/2009, SLP(C) NO. 33672/2009, SLP(C) NO.  34253/2009, SLP(C) NO. 34859/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35038/2009, SLP(C) NO.  35585/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35587/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35740/2009, SLP(C) NO.  35742/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35743-35746/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35747/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 35749/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35750/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35751/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 35752/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35753/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35754/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 35755/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35756/2009, SLP(C) NO. 35757/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 36193/2009, SLP(C) NO. 36196/2009, SLP(C) NO. 36219/2009,  SLP(C) NO. 36271/2009, W.P.(C) NO. 11/2010, W.P.(C) NO. 42/2010,  W.P.(C) NO. 43/2010, W.P.(C) NO. 44/2010, W.P.(C) NO. 46/2010, W.P.(C)  NO. 48/2010, W.P.(C) NO. 63/2010, W.P.(C) NO. 71/2010, SLP(C) NO.  104/2010, SLP(C) NO. 245/2010, SLP(C) NO. 247/2010, SLP(C) NO.  248/2010, S.L.P.(C)… /2010 CC NO. 886, S.L.P.(C)… /2010 CC NO. 1082,  SLP(C) NO. 1820/2010, SLP(C) NO. 1876/2010, SLP(C) NO. 2459/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 3387/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4102/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4362/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 4388/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4389/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4390/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 4511/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4572/2010, SLP(C) NO. 4720/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 5151/2010, SLP(C) NO. 5308/2010, SLP(C) NO. 5309/2010, C.A.  NO. 5343-5344/2010, SLP(C) NO. 6037/2010, SLP(C) NO. 6723/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 6762/2010, SLP(C) NO. 6763/2010, SLP(C) NO. 6765/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 6770/2010, SLP(C) NO. 6811/2010, SLP(C) NO. 7356/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 7426/2010, SLP(C) NO. 7776/2010, SLP(C) NO. 7929/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 9022/2010, SLP(C) NO. 9077/2010, SLP(C) NO. 9702/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 9723/2010, SLP(C) NO. 10361/2010, SLP(C) NO. 11419/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 11423/2010, SLP(C) NO. 12690/2010, SLP(C) NO. 14845/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 14886/2010, SLP(C) NO. 15015/2010, SLP(C) NO. 15903/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 16694/2010, SLP(C) NO. 16720/2010, SLP(C) NO. 18318/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 18834/2010, SLP(C) NO. 19194/2010, SLP(C) NO. 19199/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 19217/2010, SLP(C) NO. 22327/2010, SLP(C) NO. 22520/2010,  SLP(C) NO. 23836/2010, SLP(C) NO. 29578/2010, SLP(C) NO. 36486/2010,  W.P.(C) NO. 31/2011, W.P.(C) NO. 497/2011, C.A. NO. 905/2011, SLP(C)  NO. 1308/2011, C.A. NO. 2041/2011, C.A. NO. 2042/2011, S.L.P.(C)…  /2011 CC NO. 2103, SLP(C) NO. 3433/2011, SLP(C) NO. 4730/2011, SLP(C)  NO. 4743/2011, SLP(C) NO. 4747/2011, SLP(C) NO. 4750/2011, SLP(C) NO.  5094/2011, SLP(C) NO. 5105/2011, SLP(C) NO. 5106/2011, SLP(C) NO.  5110/2011, SLP(C) NO. 5112/2011, SLP(C) NO. 6351/2011, SLP(C) NO.  6492/2011, SLP(C) NO. 8571/2011, SLP(C) NO. 9758/2011, C.A. NO. 9900- 9903/2011, SLP(C) NO. 12605/2011, SLP(C) NO. 13451/2011, SLP(C) NO.  13525/2011, SLP(C) NO. 13526/2011, SLP(C) NO. 14144/2011, SLP(C) NO. 

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14269/2011, SLP(C) NO. 14342/2011, SLP(C) NO. 18858/2011, SLP(C) NO.  18859/2011, SLP(C) NO. 18862/2011, SLP(C) NO. 18863/2011, SLP(C) NO.  18864/2011, SLP(C) NO. 33344/2011, W.P.(C) NO. 278/2012, W.P.(C) NO.  290/2012, C.A. NO. 4210/2012, C.A. NO. 5860/2012, C.A. NO. 5861/2012,  C.A. NO. 8275/2012, C.A. NO. 8278/2012, C.A. NO. 8280/2012, C.A. NO.  8283/2012, C.A. NO. 8284/2012, C.A. NO. 8286/2012, C.A. NO.  8290/2012, C.A. NO. 8292/2012, C.A. NO. 8294/2012, C.A. NO.  8295/2012, C.A. NO. 8296/2012, C.A. NO. 8297/2012, C.A. NO.  8298/2012, C.A. NO. 8299/2012, C.A. NO. 8300/2012, C.A. NO.  8301/2012, C.A. NO. 8302/2012, C.A. NO. 8303/2012, C.A. NO.  8304/2012, C.A. NO. 8305/2012, C.A. NO. 8306/2012, C.A. NO.  8307/2012, C.A. NO. 8308/2012, C.A. NO. 8309/2012, C.A. NO.  8311/2012, C.A. NO. 8312/2012, C.A. NO. 8313/2012, C.A. NO.  8314/2012, C.A. NO. 8315/2012, C.A. NO. 8316/2012, SLP(C) NO.  8333/2012, C.A. NO. 8734/2012, C.A. NO. 8735/2012, C.A. NO.  8736/2012, C.A. NO. 8737/2012, C.A. NO. 8738/2012, C.A. NO.  8739/2012, C.A. NO. 8740/2012, C.A. NO. 8741/2012, C.A. NO.  8744/2012, C.A. NO. 8745/2012, C.A. NO. 8832/2012, C.A. NO.  8833/2012, C.A. NO. 8834/2012, C.A. NO. 8836/2012, C.A. NO.  8837/2012, C.A. NO. 8839/2012, C.A. NO. 8840/2012, C.A. NO.  8841/2012, C.A. NO. 8842/2012, C.A. NO. 8843/2012, C.A. NO.  8844/2012, C.A. NO. 8845/2012, C.A. NO. 8846/2012, C.A. NO.  9148/2012, C.A. NO. 9149/2012, C.A. NO. 9150/2012, C.A. NO.  9151/2012, C.A. NO. 9152/2012, C.A. NO. 9153/2012, C.A. NO.  9154/2012, C.A. NO. 9155/2012, C.A. NO. 9156/2012, C.A. NO.  9157/2012, C.A. NO. 9158/2012, C.A. NO. 9159/2012, C.A. NO.  9160/2012, C.A. NO. 9161/2012, C.A. NO. 9162/2012, C.A. NO.  9163/2012, C.A. NO. 9164/2012, C.A. NO. 9165/2012, C.A. NO.  9166/2012, C.A. NO. 9167/2012, C.A. NO. 9168/2012, C.A. NO.  9169/2012, C.A. NO. 9170/2012, C.A. NO. 9292/2012, C.A. NO.  9293/2012, SLP(C) NO. 16535-16536/2012, SLP(C) NO. 16538/2012, SLP(C)  NO. 18602/2012, SLP(C) NO. 28173/2012, SLP(C) NO. 33954/2012, SLP(C)  NO. 36187/2012, SLP(C) NO. 37455/2012, SLP(C) NO. 37680/2012, SLP(C)  NO. 37708-37709/2012, SLP(C) NO. 37712/2012, SLP(C) NO. 37728/2012,  SLP(C) NO. 38304/2012, SLP(C) NO. 38919/2012, SLP(C) NO. 39998/2012,  SLP(C) NO. 40146/2012, SLP(C) NO. 40147/2012, T.C.(C) NO. 149/2013,  SLP(C) NO. 449/2013, C.A. NO. 539/2013, C.A. NO. 540/2013, C.A. NO.  541/2013, C.A. NO. 542/2013, C.A. NO. 543/2013, C.A. NO. 544/2013,  C.A. NO. 545/2013, C.A. NO. 546/2013, C.A. NO. 547/2013, C.A. NO.  548/2013, SLP(C) NO. 1426/2013, SLP(C) NO. 8939/2013, SLP(C) NO. 

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9844/2013, SLP(C) NO. 10466/2013, SLP(C) NO. 10516/2013, SLP(C) NO.  10879/2013, SLP(C) NO. 11060/2013, SLP(C) NO. 16744-16746/2013,  SLP(C) NO. 16867/2013, SLP(C) NO. 16869/2013, SLP(C) NO. 16870/2013,  SLP(C) NO. 27001-27002/2013, SLP(C) NO. 30986/2013, SLP(C) NO.  32256/2013, SLP(C) NO. 33600/2013, C.A. NO. 1838/2014, C.A. NO.  9216/2014, C.A. NO. 9214/2014, SLP(C) NO. 29119/2014, SLP(C) NO.  208/2015, SLP(C) NO. 212/2015, SLP(C) NO. 315-317/2015, SLP(C) NO.  320/2015, SLP(C) NO. 336/2015, SLP(C) NO. 352/2015, SLP(C) NO.  376/2015, SLP(C) NO. 411-421/2015, SLP(C) NO. 380/2015, SLP(C) NO.  437/2015, SLP(C) NO. 445/2015, SLP(C) NO. 457/2015, SLP(C) NO.  508/2015, SLP(C) NO. 510/2015, SLP(C) NO. 567/2015, SLP(C) NO. 561- 562/2015, SLP(C) NO. 585/2015, SLP(C) NO. 621/2015, SLP(C) NO.  638/2015, SLP(C) NO. 641/2015, SLP(C) NO. 661/2015, SLP(C) NO.  664/2015, SLP(C) NO. 662/2015, SLP(C) NO. 669/2015, SLP(C) NO.  668/2015, SLP(C) NO. 671/2015, SLP(C) NO. 672/2015, SLP(C) NO.  675/2015, SLP(C) NO. 674/2015, SLP(C) NO. 683/2015, SLP(C) NO. 690- 691/2015, SLP(C) NO. 684-686/2015, SLP(C) NO. 693-694/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 712/2015, SLP(C) NO. 1270/2015, SLP(C) NO. 1424/2015, SLP(C) NO.  1596/2015, SLP(C) NO. 1631/2015, SLP(C) NO. 1714/2015, SLP(C) NO.  1851-1852/2015, SLP(C) NO. 1943-2001/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2038/2015,  SLP(C) NO. 2054/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2063-2065/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2081/2015, SLP(C) NO. 91/2015, SLP(C) NO. 4557/2015, SLP(C) NO.  4581/2015, SLP(C) NO. 4657/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5046/2015, SLP(C) NO.  5107/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5131/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5143/2015, SLP(C) NO.  5375/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5447/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5610/2015, SLP(C) NO.  5966/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6086/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6143/2015, SLP(C) NO.  6158/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6240-6243/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6565/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 6575/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6631/2015, SLP(C) NO. 4600/2015, SLP(C) NO.  5007/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6728/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6754-6755/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 6823/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6907/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6909-6910/2015,  SLP(C) NO. 6939/2015, SLP(C) NO. 6956/2015, SLP(C) NO. 4386/2015,  SLP(C) NO. 7319/2015, SLP(C) NO. 7957-7958/2015, SLP(C) NO.  8089/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2483/2015, SLP(C) NO. 8248/2015, SLP(C) NO.  8325/2015, SLP(C) NO. 8350-8351/2015, SLP(C) NO. 8527/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 9585/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11830/2015, SLP(C) NO. 8798/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 9584/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5311-5329/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11204- 11205/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9164/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9167/2015, SLP(C) NO.  9176/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9181/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11832/2015, SLP(C) NO.  9188/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9348/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5908/2015, SLP(C) NO.  9386/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9484/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9582/2015, SLP(C) NO. 

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7874/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11080-11086/2015, SLP(C) NO. 12839/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 11156/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11170/2015, SLP(C) NO. 12844/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 8162/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11484/2015, SLP(C) NO. 12847/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 11582/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11592/2015, SLP(C) NO. 13200/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 13201/2015, SLP(C) NO. 4219-4227/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2966- 

2999/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11888/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11203/2015, SLP(C) NO.  14828/2015, SLP(C) NO. 14854/2015, SLP(C) NO. 15856/2015, SLP(C) NO.  15857/2015, SLP(C) NO. 15858/2015, SLP(C) NO. 11458-11465/2015,  SLP(C) NO. 18213/2015, SLP(C) NO. 18333/2015, SLP(C) NO. 16312/2015,  SLP(C) NO. 18334/2015, SLP(C) NO. 18335/2015, SLP(C) NO. 15855/2015,  SLP(C) NO. 18338/2015, SLP(C) NO. 18184/2015, SLP(C) NO. 18179/2015,  C.A. NO. 1956/2003, SLP(C) NO. 8775-8777/2015, SLP(C) NO. 5303/2015,  SLP(C) NO. 16853/2015, SLP(C) NO. 21720/2015, SLP(C) NO. 23673- 23674/2015, SLP(C) NO. 23764/2015, SLP(C) NO. 23765/2015, SLP(C) NO.  15353/2015, SLP(C) NO. 22349/2015, SLP(C) NO. 21718/2015, SLP(C) NO.  24547/2015, SLP(C) NO. 23757/2015, C.A. NO. 8240/2015, SLP(C) NO.  26751/2015, SLP(C) NO. 9117/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2214/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2531/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2289/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2530/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2392/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2499/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2502/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2538-2543/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2426/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2358/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 2401/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2389/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2485/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2495/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3163-3164/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3666/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 3679/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3723/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3321/2015, SLP(C) NO.  4198-4199/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3325/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3466/2015, SLP(C)  NO. 3635/2015, SLP(C) NO. 3318/2015, SLP(C) NO. 30396/2015, C.A. NO.  110/2016, C.A. NO. 109/2016, C.A. NO. 583/2016, SLP(C) NO. 4945/2016,  SLP(C) NO. 8253/2016, SLP(C) NO. 8204/2008, C.A. NO. 3925/2016, SLP(C)  NO. 2057/2016, SLP(C) NO. 86/2016, SLP(C) NO. 72/2016, C.A. NO.  5534/2016, C.A. NO. 5536/2016, C.A. NO. 5137/2016, SLP(C) NO.  33923/2012, C.A. NO. 5537/2016, SLP(C) NO. 16116/2009, SLP(C) NO.  30594/2009, SLP(C) NO. 2636/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2680/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2952/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2641/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2588/2015, SLP(C) NO.  2928/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2737/2015, SLP(C) NO. 2682/2015, SLP(C) NO.  8197-8198/2015, SLP(C) NO. 4197/2015, C.A. NO. 5538/2016, C.A. NO.  5533/2016, SLP(C) NO. 14539-14541/2016, SLP(C) NO. 16820/2016, C.A.  NO. 4642-4643/2016 

J U D G M E N T

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T.S. THAKUR, CJI (for himself and A.K. Sikri and A.M. Khanwilkar, JJ.) 1. These appeals bring to fore for our determination vexed questions touching  the interpretation of Articles 301 to 307 comprising Part XIII of the Constitution which  have been the subject matter of several Constitution Bench decisions of this Court,  all but one, decided by majority. The questions assume in a great measure  considerable public importance not only because the same deal with the powers of  the State legislatures to levy taxes but also because any pronouncement of this  Court is bound to impact the federal character of our polity and the Centre-State  relationship in legislative and fiscal matters. There is no gainsaying that it is the  importance of the questions that lies at the bottom of the present reference to a  larger Bench made in the following circumstances.  

  1. In exercise of their legislative powers under Entry 52 of List II of the Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution several States in the country, at least 14 of whom are  parties to these proceedings, have enacted laws that provide for levy of a tax on  the “entry of goods into local areas comprising the States”. The constitutional  validity of these levies was questioned in different High Courts by assesses/dealers  aggrieved of the same, inter alia, on the ground that the same were violative of the  constitutionally recognised right to free trade commerce and intercourse guaranteed under Article 301 of the Constitution of India. The levies were also  assailed on the ground that the same were discriminatory and, therefore, violative  of Article 304(a) of the Constitution of India. Absence of Presidential sanction in  terms of Article 304(b) of the Constitution of India was also set-up as a ground of  challenge to the levies imposed by the respective State legislatures. Writ Petition 

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(Civil) No. 8700 of 2000 filed before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana was one  such petition that assailed the constitutional validity of the Haryana Local  Development Act, 2000. Relying upon the decisions of this Court in Atiabari Tea Co.  Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors. (AIR 1961 SC 232); Automobile Transport (Rajasthan)  Ltd. etc. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (AIR 1962 SC 1406); M/s. Bhagatram Rajeev  Kumar v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. and Ors. (1995 Supp [1] SCC 673 ); and  State of Bihar and Ors. v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce and Ors. (1996) 9 SCC 136, a  Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the said petition  and connected matters on the ground that the levy was compensatory in  character hence outside the purview of Article 301. 

  1. The correctness of the said order was assailed before this Court in Jindal Stripe  Ltd. and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2003) 8 SCC 60. A two-Judge Bench of  this Court, however, referred the matter to a larger Bench as it noticed an apparent  conflict between the pronouncements of this Court in Atiabari (supra) and  Automobile Transport (supra) cases on the one hand and Bhagatram (supra) and  Bihar Chamber of Commerce (supra) on the other. The Court after noticing the development of law on the subject observed: 

“25. To sum up: the pre-1995 decisions held that an exaction to reimburse/recompense the State the cost of  an existing facility made available to the traders or the cost  of a specific facility planned to be provided to the traders  is compensatory tax and that it is implicit in such a levy that  it must, more or less, be commensurate with the cost of the  service or facility. The decisions emphasized that the  imposition of tax must be with the definite purpose of  meeting the expenses on account of providing or adding  to the trading facilities either immediately or in future  provided the quantum of tax sought to be generated is 

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based on a reasonable relation to the actual or projected  expenditure on the cost of the service or facility. 

  1. The decisions in Bhagatram and Bihar Chamber of  Commerce now say that even if the purpose of imposition  of the tax is not merely to confer a special advantage on  the traders but to benefit the public in general including  the traders, that levy can still be considered to be  compensatory. According to this view, an indirect or  incidental benefit to traders by reason of stepping up the  developmental activities in various local areas of the State  can be legitimately brought within the concept of  compensatory tax, the nexus between the tax known as  compensatory tax and the trading facilities not being  necessarily either direct or specific.  
  2. Since the concept of compensatory tax has been judicially evolved as an exception to the provisions of  Article 301 and as the parameters of this judicial concept  are blurred, particularly by reason of the decisions in  Bhagatram and Bihar Chamber of Commerce we are of  the view that the interpretation of Article 301 vis-à-vis  compensatory tax should be authoritatively laid down with  certitude by the Constitution Bench under Article 145(3).  
  3. In the circumstances let all these matters be placed  

before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appropriate  

directions.” 

  1. The matters were, pursuant to the above, placed before a Constitution Bench  of this Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd. (2) and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors., (2006)  7 SCC 241 which resolved the conflict noticed in the reference order by holding that  the working test propounded by seven Judges in Automobile Transport case (supra)  was incompatible with the test of ‘some connection’ enunciated by the three  Judge Bench in Bhagatram’s case (supra). The Court held that the test of ‘some  connection’ as propounded in Bhagatram’s case (supra) had no application to the 

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concept of compensatory tax. The Court, accordingly, overruled the decisions  rendered in Bhagatram and Bihar Chamber of Commerce cases and held that the  doctrine of ‘direct and immediate effect’ of the impugned law on trade and  commerce under Article 301 as propounded in Atiabari (supra) and the working test 

enunciated in Automobile Transport (supra) cases for deciding whether a tax is  compensatory or not will continue to apply. The Court observed: 

“53. We reiterate that the doctrine of “direct and  immediate effect” of the impugned law on trade and  commerce under Article 301 as propounded in Atiabari  Tea Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam and the working test  enunciated in Automobile Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. v.  State of Rajasthan for deciding whether a tax is  compensatory or not vide para 19 of the Report (AIR), will  continue to apply and the test of “some connection” indicated in para 8 (of SCC) of the judgment in Bhagatram  Rajeevkumar v. CST and followed in State of Bihar v.  Bihar Chamber of Commerce is, in our opinion, not good  law. Accordingly, the constitutional validity of various local  enactments which are the subject-matters of pending appeals, special leave petitions and writ petitions will now  be listed for being disposed of in the light of this judgment.” 

  1. The matters were, in terms of the above direction, listed before a two-Judge  bench for hearing of the appeals in the light of the above pronouncement of the  Constitution Bench. The two-Judge Bench, however, noticed that although the  basic issue in the appeals revolved around the concept of compensatory tax, the  High Courts had not examined the same as they had considered themselves  bound by the view taken in Bhagatram and Bihar Chamber of Commerce cases  (supra). The Court further found that in the absence of relevant data before the  High Courts, the issue whether the levies were compensatory could not have been 

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considered and accordingly referred the matter back to the High Courts to decide  the said aspect. The appeals were, in the meantime, adjourned to await the  finding from the High Courts on the question whether the levies were indeed  compensatory in nature having regard to the decisions of this Court in Atiabari and  Automobile Transport cases (supra).  

  1. The matters were accordingly taken up by the High Courts, after the remand,  who came to the conclusion that the impugned levies were neither compensatory  in character nor was the procedure stipulated by Article 304(b) and the proviso to  the same followed. The levies were on that basis held to be in violation of Article  301 being an impediment to free trade, commerce and intercourse and  accordingly struck down. The High Courts of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh,  Jharkhand, Kerala and Tamil Nadu struck down the levies imposed by their  respective States also on the ground that they were discriminatory in nature hence  violative of Article 304(a) of the Constitution.  
  2. All these judgments and orders of the High Courts, passed after the remand,  then, came to be challenged by the States concerned in the appeals filed against  the same. These appeals initially came-up before a two-Judge Bench of this Court  comprising Justice Arijit Pasayat and Justice S.H. Kapadia. Their Lordships referred  the same to a Constitution Bench for an authoritative pronouncement on as many  as ten questions formulated in the reference order (Jaiprakash Associates Limited  v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. (2009) 7 SCC 339). The Court noticed the  arguments advanced on behalf of the assessees that entry taxes were, in essence  and in the classical sense, in the nature of ‘a fee’ and not ‘a tax’. It also noted the 28  

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contention that all the cases on which the parties had placed reliance related to  entry tax in the context of tax on vehicles in contradiction to taxes on entry of  goods. The Court was of the view that while the Constitution Bench in Jindal  Stainless Ltd. (2) (supra) had dealt with some aspects of the matter, certain other  important constitutional issues remained to be examined especially because a  conceptually and contextually different approach may be required vis-à-vis 

“transport cases” on the one hand and cases of “entry tax on goods” on the other.  The questions formulated by the Court for determination by the Constitution Bench  were in the following words: 

 “(1) Whether the State enactments relating to levy of entry  tax have to be tested with reference to both clauses (a)  and (b) of Article 304 of the Constitution for determining  their validity and whether clause (a) of Article 304 is  conjunctive with or separate from clause (b) of Article 304?  

 (2) Whether imposition of entry tax levied in terms of Entry  52 List II of the Schedule VII is violative of Article 301 of the  Constitution? If the answer is in the affirmative whether  such levy can be protected if entry tax is compensatory in  character and if the answer to the aforesaid question is in  the affirmative what are the yardsticks to be applied to  determine the compensatory character of the entry tax?  

 (3) Whether Entry 52 List II, Schedule VII of the Constitution  like other taxing entries in the Schedule, merely provides a  taxing field for exercising the power to levy and whether  collection of entry tax which ordinarily would be credited  to the Consolidated Fund of the State being a revenue  received by the Government of the State and would have  to be appropriated in accordance with law and for the  purposes and in the manner provided in the Constitution as  per Article 266 and there is nothing express or explicit in  Entry 52 List II, Schedule VII which would compel the State  to spend the tax collected within the local area in which it 

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was collected?  

 (4) Will the principles of quid pro quo relevant to a fee  apply in the matter of taxes imposed under Part XIII?  

 (5) Whether the entry tax may be levied at all where the  goods meant for being sold, used or consumed come to  rest (standstill) after the movement of the goods ceases in  the “local area”?  

 (6) Whether the entry tax can be termed a tax on the  movement of goods when there is no bar to the entry of  goods at the State border or when it passes through a local  area within which they are not sold, used or consumed?  

 (7) Whether interpretation of Articles 301 to 304 in the  context of tax on vehicles (commonly known as  

“transport”) cases in Atiabari case and Automobile  

Transport case apply to entry tax cases and if so, to what  

extent?  

 (8) Whether the non-discriminatory indirect State tax which  is capable of being passed on and has been passed on by  traders to the consumers infringes Article 301 of the  

Constitution?  

 (9) Whether a tax on goods within the State which directly  impedes the trade and thus violates Article 301 of the  

Constitution can be saved by reference to Article 304 of  

the Constitution alone or can be saved by any other 

article?  

 (10) Whether a levy under Entry 52 List II, even if held to be  in nature of a compensatory levy, must, on the principle of  equivalence demonstrate that the value of the  

quantifiable benefit is represented by the costs incurred in  procuring the facility/services (which costs in turn become  the basis of reimbursement/recompense for the provider of  the services/facilities) to be provided in the “local area”  

concerned and whether the entire State or a part thereof  

can be comprehended as local area for the purpose of  

entry tax?”

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  1. The matter was accordingly placed before a five-Judge Bench of this Court  (Jindal Stainless Limited and Anr. v. State of Haryana and Ors. (2010) 4 SCC 595) who briefly referred to the decisions in Atiabari, Automobile Transport cases (supra) and Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. CIT (AIR 1965 SC 1636) and a few others and referred  the matters to a larger Bench for reconsideration of the judgment of this Court in  Atiabari and Automobile Transport (supra). The Court noted that the correctness of  the view taken in the said two cases had been doubted as early as in the year  1975 in G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu (1975) 1 SCC 375. The reference order  briefly set out some of the questions that required consideration by a larger Bench.  The Court said:  

“11. Some of these aspects which need consideration by a  larger Bench of this Court may be briefly enumerated.  Interplay/interrelationship between Article 304(a) and  Article 304(b). The significance of the word “and” 

between Articles 304(a) and 304(b). The significance of  the non obstante clause in Article 304. The balancing of  freedom of trade and commerce in Article 301 vis-a-vis the  States’ authority to levy taxes under Articles 245 and 246 of  the Constitution read with the appropriate legislative  entries in the Seventh Schedule, particularly in the context  of movement of trade and commerce.  

  1. Whether Article 304(a) and Article 304(b) deal with  different subjects? Whether the impugned taxation law to  be valid under Article 304 (a) must also fulfil the conditions  mentioned in Article 304(b), including Presidential assent?  Whether the word “restrictions” in Article 302 and in Article  304(b) includes tax laws? Whether validity of a law  impugned as violative of Article 301 should be judged only  in the light of the test of non-discrimination? Does Article  303 circumscribe Article 301? Whether “internal goods”  would come under Article 304(b) and “external goods”  under Article 304(a)? Whether “per se test” propounded in  Atiabari case should or should not be rejected? Whether  tax simpliciter constitutes a restriction under Part XIII of the 

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Constitution? Whether the word “restriction” in Article  304(b) includes tax laws? Is taxation justiciable? Whether  the “working test” laid down in Atiabari makes a tax law  per se violative of Article 301? Interrelationship between  Article 19(1)(g) and Article 301 of the Constitution? These  are some of the questions which warrant reconsideration  of the judgments in Atiabari Tea Co. Ltd. and Automobile  Transport (Rajasthan) Ltd. by a larger Bench of this Court.” 

  1. At the hearing before us learned counsel for the parties agreed after a day – long exploratory exercise that the questions that fall for determination by this Court  could be re-framed as under:  
  2. Can the levy of a non-discriminatory tax per se constitute infraction of  Article 301 of the Constitution of India?  
  3. If answer to question No. 1 is in the affirmative, can a tax which is  compensatory in nature also fall foul of Article 301 of the Constitution of  India?  
  4. What are the tests for determining whether the tax or levy is compensatory  in nature?  
  5. Is the Entry Tax levied by the States in the present batch of cases violative  of Article 301 of the Constitution and in particular have the impugned  State enactments relating to entry tax to be tested with reference to both  Articles 304(a) and 304(b) of the Constitution for determining their validity? 
  6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length on the  above questions which we shall now take up for discussion ad-seriatim.  

Re: Question No. 1 

  1. Whether non-discriminatory fiscal measures also impede free trade,  commerce and intercourse and thereby fall foul of Article 301 of the Constitution 

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can be answered only if one keeps in view the Constitutional scheme underlying  separation of powers in a federal system of governance like the one chosen by us.  The answer would also depend upon the way we look at, understand and interpret  the provisions of the Constitution and in particular the provisions of Parts XI, XII and  XIII thereof. Interpretation of these and indeed every other provision must have due  regard to what are recognised as the basic features of the Constitution. In doing so,  the approach of the Courts can neither be rigid nor wooden or pedantic. Being a  living and dynamic document, the Constitution ought to receive an equally  dynamic and pragmatic interpretation that harmonizes and balances competing  aims and objectives and promotes attainment of national goals and objectives. It  must, as observed by this Court, in Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992) Supp 2 SCC  651 be read as a logical whole. The Constitutional provisions cannot be read in  isolation, nor can they be interpreted in a manner that renders another provision  redundant declared this Court in T.M.A. Pai Foundation and others v. State of  Karnataka (2002) 8 SCC 481. If words used in the provision are imprecise, protean  or evocative or can reasonably bear meaning more than one, it would be  legitimate for the Court to go beyond the literal confines of the provision and to call  in aid other well recognised rules of construction such as legislative history, the  basic scheme and framework of the statute as a whole, the object sought to be  achieved and the consequence flowing from the adoption of one in preference to  the other possible interpretation observed this Court in Chief Justice of Andhra  Pradesh and others. v. L.V. A. Dixitulu and others (1979) 2 SCC 34. Reference may  also be made to the decision of this Court in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala  (1973) 4 SCC 225 where this Court quoted with approval Lord Greene’s33  

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observations in the following words: 

“56. ……It is not right to construe words in vacuum and  

then insert the meaning into an article. Lord Green  

observed in Bidie v. General Accident, Fire and Life  

Assurance Corporation [1948] 2 All E.R. 995:  

The first thing one has to do, I venture to think, in construing  words in a section of an Act of Parliament is not to take  those words in vacuo, so to speak, and attribute to them  what is sometimes called their natural or ordinary meaning.  Few words in the English language have a natural or ordinary meaning in the sense that they must be so read  that their meaning is entirely independent of their context.  The method of construing statutes that I prefer is not to  take particular words and attribute to them a sort of prima  facie meaning which you may have to displace or modify.  It is to read the statute as a whole and ask oneself the  question: ‘In this state, in this context, relating to this  subject-matter, what is the true meaning of that word.  

  1. I respectfully adopt the reasoning of Lord Green in  

construing the expression “the amendment of the  

Constitution….  

xxxxxxxx  

  1. I may also refer to the observation of Gwyer, C.J., and  

Lord Wright:  

“A grant of the power in general terms, standing by 

itself, would no doubt be construed in the wider sense; but  it may be qualified by other express provisions in the same  enactment, by the implications of the context, and even  by considerations arising out of what appears to be the  general scheme of the Act.” (Per Gwyer, C.J. — The  Central Provinces and Berar Act, 1939, FCR 18 at 42 MR).  

“The question, then, is one of construction and in the  

ultimate resort must be determined upon the actual words  used, read not in vacua but as occurring in a single  

complex instrument, in which one part may throw light on  

another. The Constitution has been described as the

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federal compact, and the Construction must hold a  

balance between all its parts.” (Per Lord Wright — James v.  Commonwealth of Australia, 1936 AC 578 at 613.)” 

  1. It is trite that a narrow interpretation that may have the potential or tendency  to subvert the delicate balance which the framers of the Constitution had in mind  while distributing legislative businesses including the sovereign power to levy taxes  must be avoided and a construction that is most beneficial for a harmonious  relationship between different limbs of the State including that between the Centre  and the States or States inter se adopted. This may, at times, involve ironing out of  rough edges which exercise a Constitutional Court must necessarily undertake to  avoid confusion and resultant negation of the Constitutional objectives.  
  2. Having said so, we must sail smooth on certain fundamentals before we  address the question whether levy of taxes per se operate as an impediment or  restriction on the right to free trade, commerce and intercourse. That is because a  true and correct answer to Question No.1 can be found only if we constantly keep  those fundamentals in mind while attempting to resolve what has been found to be  somewhat difficult to resolve. For instance, whether levy of a tax is an attribute of  sovereignty and if so whether Article 246 of the Constitution recognises the  sovereign power of the State to make laws including the power to levy taxes on  subjects enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution is an  important dimension that must be addressed as a part of the interpretative  exercise. So also, we must examine whether power to tax if held to be subservient  to Article 301, shall have the effect of denuding the States of their sovereignty in the 

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matter of levy of taxes and in the process affect the federal structure of the polity  envisaged by the Constitution. If levy of taxes is always presumed to be reasonable  and in public interest, whether such levies could be said to be within the  contemplation of Article 304(b) when it provided for imposition of “reasonable  restrictions in public interest” is yet another aspect that must be explored especially  when the reasonableness of any restriction within the comprehension of Article  304(b) is not free from judicial scrutiny by Courts. These are some of the broad and  fundamental issues that need to be examined before we attempt to answer the  question whether levy of taxes per se acts as an impediment for free trade,  commerce and intercourse. We may now briefly refer to these fundamentals  before adverting to the provisions of Part XIII that fall for our interpretation.  

Power to Tax : an Attribute of sovereignty 

  1. Power to levy taxes has been universally acknowledged as an essential  attribute of sovereignty. Cooley in his Book on Taxation – Volume-1 (4th Edn.) in  Chapter-2 recognises the power of taxation to be inherent in a sovereign State. The  power, says the author, is inherent in the people and is meant to recover a  contribution of money or other property in accordance with some reasonable rule  or apportionment for the purpose of defraying public expenses. The following  passage from the book is apposite: 

57. Power to tax as an inherent attribute of sovereignty. 

  

The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute  of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right to every  independent government. It is possessed by the  government without being expressly conferred by the 

people. The power is inherent in the people because the  sustenance of the government requires contributions from 

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them. In fact the power of taxation may be defined as  “the power inherent in the sovereign state to recover a  contribution of money or other property, in accordance  with some reasonable rule or apportionment, from the  property or occupations within its jurisdiction for the  purpose of defraying the public expenses.” Constitutional  provisions relating to the power of taxation do not operate  as grants of the power of taxation to the government but  instead merely constitute limitations upon a power which  would otherwise be practically without limit. This inherent  power to tax extends to everything over which the  sovereign power extends, but not to anything beyond its  sovereign power. Even the federal government’s power of  taxation does not include things beyond its sovereign  power. But where exclusive jurisdiction over land is granted  to another state or country, the land remains subject to the  taxing power of the state within whose boundaries it is  located.” 

  1. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Raja Jagannath Baksh  Singh v. State of U.P. & Anr. (AIR 1962 SC 1563) where this Court observed: “…. The power of taxation is, no doubt, the sovereign right of the State; as was observed by Chief Justice Marshall in M’Culloch v. Maryland [4 Law Edn.579 p.607] : “The power  of taxing the people and their property is essential to the  very existence of Government, and may be legitimately  exercised on the objects to which it is applicable to the  utmost extent to which the Government may choose to carry it.” In that sense, it is not the function of the court to  enquire whether the power of taxation has been  reasonably exercised either in respect of the amount taxed  or in respect of the property which is made the object of  the tax. Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax  shall be levied or collected, except by authority of law;  and so, for deciding whether a tax has been validly levied  or not, it would be necessary first to enquire whether the  legislature which passes the Act was competent to pass it  or not.”  

(Emphasis supplied) 

  1. Reference may also be made to Dena Bank v. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas  Parekh & Co. (2000) 5 SCC 694 where this Court held: 

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on the rule of necessity and of public policy. The basic  justification for the claim for priority of State debts rests on  the well-recognised principle that the State is entitled to  raise money by taxation because unless adequate revenue  is received by the State, it would not be able to function as  a sovereign Government at all. It is essential that as a  sovereign, the State should be able to discharge its primary  governmental functions and in order to be able to  discharge such functions efficiently, it must be in possession  of necessary funds and this consideration emphasises the  necessity and the wisdom of conceding to the State, the  right to claim priority in respect of its tax dues (see Builders  Supply Corpn.[AIR 1965 SC 1061: (1965) 56 ITR 91])”  

 (Emphasis supplied) 

  1. In Commissioner of Income Tax, Udiapur, Rajasthan v. MCdowell and Co.  Ltd. (2009) 10 SCC 755 where this Court reiterated the legal position in the following  words: 

“21. “Tax”, “duty”, “cess” or “fee” constituting a class  denotes to various kinds of imposts by State in its sovereign  power of taxation to raise revenue for the State. Within the  expression of each specie each expression denotes  different kind of impost depending on the purpose for  which they are levied. This power can be exercised in any  of its manifestation only under any law authorising levy and  collection of tax as envisaged under Article 265 which uses  only the expression that no “tax” shall be levied and  collected except authorised by law. It in its elementary  meaning conveys that to support a tax legislative action is  essential, it cannot be levied and collected in the absence  of any legislative sanction by exercise of executive power  of State under Article 73 by the Union or Article 162 by the  State.  

  1. Under Article 366(28) “Taxation” has been defined to  include the imposition of any tax or impost whether general or local or special and tax shall be construed  accordingly. “Impost” means compulsory levy. The well known and well-settled characteristic of “tax” in its wider sense includes all imposts. Imposts in the context have 

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following characteristics: 

(i) The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty.  

(ii) “Law” in the context of Article 265 means an Act of  legislature and cannot comprise an executive order or rule  without express statutory authority.  

(iii) The term “tax” under Article 265 read with Article  

366(28) includes imposts of every kind viz. tax, duty, cess or  fees.  

(iv) As an incident of sovereignty and in the nature of  

compulsory exaction, a liability founded on principle of  

contract cannot be a “tax” in its technical sense as an  

impost, general, local or special. “  

 (Emphasis Supplied) 

Power of Taxation under the Constitution: 

  1. We shall presently turn to the Constitutional limitations on the sovereign  power to tax but before we do so we need to point out that while the power to  levy taxes is an attribute of sovereignty, exercise of that power is controlled by the  Constitution. This is evident from the provisions of Article 265 which forbids levy or  recovery of any tax except by the authority of law. It reads:  

265. Taxes not to be imposed save by authority of law –  

No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of  

law.” 

The authority of law referred to above must be traceable to a provision in the  Constitution especially where the legislative powers are shared by the Centre and  the States as is the case with our Constitution which provides for what has been  described as quasi federal system of governance.  

The source of power to enact laws is contained in Articles 245 and 246 of the  Constitution which read:

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245. Extent of laws made by Parliament and by the  Legislatures of States – (1) Subject to the provisions of this  Constitution, Parliament may make laws for the whole or  any part of the territory of India, and the Legislature of a  State may make laws for the whole or any part of the  State.  

(2) No law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be 

invalid on the ground that it would have extra-territorial  

operation.  

  1. Subject-matter of laws made by Parliament and by the  Legislatures of States – (1) Notwithstanding anything in  clauses (2) and (3), Parliament has exclusive power to  make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated  in List I in the Seventh Schedule (in this Constitution referred  to as the “Union List”).  

(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (3), Parliament and ,  subject to clause (1), the Legislature of any State also,  have power to make laws with respect to any of the  matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule (in  this Constitution referred to as the “Concurrent List”).  

(3) Subject to clauses (1) and (2), the Legislature of any  

State has exclusive power to make laws for such State or  

any part thereof with respect to any of the matters 

enumerated in List II in the Seventh Schedule (in this  

Constitution referred to as the ‘State List’).  

(4)Parliament has power to make laws with respect to any  matter for any part of the territory of India not included [in  a State] notwithstanding that such matter is a matter  

enumerated in the State List.” 

  1. Interpreting Articles 245 and 246, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in M/s.  Hoechst Pharmaceuticals Ltd and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors. (1983) 4 SCC 45,  held on a review of the available decisions that the Constitution effects a complete  separation of taxing powers of the Union and the States under Article 246 and that  there is no overlapping anywhere in the exercise of that power. The sources of 40  

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taxation are clearly delineated, observed the Court. The Court also held that there  is a distinction between general subjects of legislation and taxation for the former  are dealt within one group while the later is dealt with in a separate group. The  result is that the power to tax cannot be deduced from a general legislative entry.  That view was approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of West  Bengal v. Kesoram Industries Ltd. (2004) 10 SCC 201. The propositions stated in the  two decisions must therefore be treated to be fairly well settled. Reference may  also be made to the decision of this Court in State of Kerala and ors. v. Mar  Appraem Kuri Co. Ltd. and Anr. (2012) 7 SCC 106 where this Court explained the  sweep and purport of Articles 245 and 246: 

“35. Article 245 deals with extent of laws made by  Parliament and by the legislatures of States. The verb  “made”, in past tense, finds place in the Head Note to  Article 245. The verb “make”, in the present tense, exists in  Article 245(1) whereas the verb “made”, in the past tense,  finds place in Article 245(2). While the legislative power is  derived from Article 245, the entries in the Seventh  Schedule of the Constitution only demarcate the legislative  fields of the respective legislatures and do not confer  legislative power as such. While Parliament has power to  make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India,  the legislature of a State can make laws only for the State  or part thereof. Thus, Article 245 inter alia indicates the  extent of laws made by Parliament and by the State  Legislatures.  

  1. Article 246 deals with the subject-matter of laws made  by Parliament and by the legislatures of States. The verb  “made” once again finds place in the Head Note to Article  246. This article deals with distribution of legislative powers

as between the Union and the State Legislatures, with  reference to the different Lists in the Seventh Schedule. In  short, Parliament has full and exclusive powers to legislate  with respect to matters in List I and has also power to  legislate with respect to matters in List III, whereas the State 

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Legislatures, on the other hand, have exclusive power to  legislate with respect to matters in List II, minus matters  falling in List I and List III and have concurrent power with  respect to matters in List III. (See Subrahmanyan Chettiar v.  Muttuswami Goundan) 

  1. Article 246, thus, provides for distribution, as between Union and the States, of the legislative powers which are conferred by Article 245. Article 245 begins with the  expression “subject to the provisions of this Constitution”.  Therefore, Article 246 must be read as “subject to other  provisions of the Constitution”. 
  2. For the purposes of this decision, the point which needs to be emphasised is that Article 245 deals with conferment of legislative powers whereas Article 246 provides for  distribution of the legislative powers. Article 245 deals with  extent of laws whereas Article 246 deals with distribution of  legislative powers. In these articles, the Constitution Framers  have used the word “make” and not “commencement”  which has a specific legal connotation. [See Section 3(13)  of the General Clauses Act, 1897.]”  

(Emphasis supplied) 

Limitations on the Exercise of Power 

  1. Exercise of sovereign power is, however, subject to Constitutional limitations  especially in a federal system like ours where the States also to the extent  permissible exercise the power to make laws including laws that levy taxes, duties  and fees. That the power to levy taxes is subject to constitutional limitations is no  longer res-integra. A Constitution Bench of this Court has in Synthetics and  Chemicals Ltd. and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. (1990) 1 SCC 109 recognised that  in India the Centre and the States both enjoy the exercise of sovereign power, to  the extent the Constitution confers upon them that power. This Court declared: 

“56 … We would not like, however, to embark upon any  

theory of police power because the Indian Constitution 

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does not recognise police power as such. But we must  

recognise the exercise of Sovereign power which gives the  State sufficient authority to enact any law subject to the  

limitations of the Constitution to discharge its functions.  

Hence, the Indian Constitution as a sovereign State has  

power to legislate on all branches except to the limitation  

as to the division of powers between the Centre and the  

States and also subject to the fundamental rights  

guaranteed under the Constitution. The Indian States,  

between the Centre and the States, has sovereign power.  The sovereign power is plenary and inherent in every  

sovereign State to do all things which promote the health,  peace, morals, education and good order of the people.  

Sovereignty is difficult to define. This power of sovereignty  

is, however, subject to constitutional limitations.”This power,  according to some constitutional authorities, is to the  

public what necessity is to the individual. Right to tax or  

levy impost must be in accordance with the provisions of  

the Constitution.” 

  1. What then are the Constitutional limitations on the power of the State  legislatures to levy taxes or for that matter enact legislations in the field reserved for  them under the relevant entries of List II and III of the Seventh Schedule. The first  and the foremost of these limitations appears in Article 13 of the Constitution of  India which declares that all laws in force in the territory of India immediately  before the commencement of the Constitution are void to the extent they are  inconsistent with the provisions of Part III dealing with the fundamental rights  guaranteed to the citizens. It forbids the States from making any law which takes  away or abridges, any provision of Part III. Any law made in contravention of the  said rights shall to the extent of contravention be void. There is no gain saying that  the power to enact laws has been conferred upon the Parliament subject to the  above Constitutional limitation. So also in terms of Article 248, the residuary power 

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to impose a tax not otherwise mentioned in the Concurrent List or the State List has  been vested in the Parliament to the exclusion of the State legislatures, and the  States’ power to levy taxes limited to what is specifically reserved in their favour  and no more.  

  1. Article 249 similarly empowers the Parliament to legislate with respect to a  matter in the State List for national interest provided the Council of States has  declared by a resolution supported by not less than two-thirds of the members  present and voting that it is necessary or expedient in national interest to do so.  The power is available till such time any resolution remains in force in terms of  Article 249 (2) and the proviso thereunder.  
  2. Article 250 is yet another provision which empowers the Parliament to  legislate with respect to any matter in the State List when there is a proclamation  of emergency. In the event of an inconsistency between laws made by  Parliament under Articles 249 and 250, and laws made by legislature of the States,  the law made by Parliament shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, prevail over  the law made by the State in terms of Article 251.  
  3. The power of Parliament to legislate for two or more States by consent, in  regard to matters not otherwise within the power of the Parliament is regulated by  Article 252, while Article 253 starting with a non-obstante clause empowers  Parliament to make any law for the whole country or any part of the territory of  India for implementing any treaty, agreement or convention with any other  country or countries or any decision made at any international conference,  association or other body.  
  4. Article 285 exempts the property of the Union from all taxes imposed by the  States save in so far as the Parliament may by law provide. Article 286 places yet 44  

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another Constitutional limitation on the State’s power to collect any levy that  imposes or authorises the imposition of a tax on the sale or purchase of goods  where such sale or purchase takes place outside the State or in the course of  import of the goods into or export of the goods outside the territory of India. It also  makes any law of a State imposing tax on sale or purchase of goods of special  importance in inter State trade or commerce or a tax on the sale or purchase of  goods being a tax of the nature referred to in the relevant sub-clauses of clause  29(A) of Article 366 subject to such restrictions and conditions as to the system of  levy, rates and other incidents of tax as the Parliament may by law specify.  

  1. Article 287 places a Constitutional limitation on the State’s legislative power  to enact laws in so far as imposition of tax on consumption or sale of electricity  consumed by the Government of India or sold to the Government of India for  consumption by the Government or for consumption of the construction,  maintenance or operation of any railway by the Government of India or a rail  company etc. Similarly, Article 288 contains a Constitutional limitation on the  power of the State in so far as imposition of a tax in respect of any water or  electricity stored, generated, consumed, distributed or sold by any authority  established by any existing law or any law made by the Parliament is concerned.  
  2. It would thus appear that even when Article 246(2) and (3) confers exclusive  power on the State legislatures to make laws with respect to matters in the Seventh  Schedule such legislative power is exercisable subject to constitutional limitations  referred to above. What is significant is that the power of the State legislatures to  levy taxes is also subject to the limitations of Article 304(a) of the Constitution 45  

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appearing in Part XIII thereof, which part regulates trade, commerce and  intercourse within the territory of India and comprises Articles 301 to 307. The  provisions of these Articles have been the subject matter of a series of decisions of  this Court including several Constitution Bench decisions to some of which we shall  presently refer. The language employed in the provisions and the non-obstante  clauses with which the same start have all the same given rise to several  contentious issues for determination by this Court over the past five decades or so.  The fact that the present batch of cases had to be referred to a Nine-Judge  Bench to once again examine the very same issues as have been debated and  determined in the previous judgments of this Court only shows that the task of  interpreting the provisions is by no means easy and has in fact become more and  more difficult on account of the pronouncements of this Court taking different  views not many of which have been unanimous. The marked difference in the  approach adopted by learned counsel for the parties in these appeals is also a  measure of the complexities of issues that fall for determination. This is specially so  because the prevailing legal position in terms of the judgment of this Court in  Atiabari and Automobile cases (supra) holding that fiscal measures that are  compensatory fall beyond the mischief of Article 301 has been questioned by both  sides. Mr. Harish Salve who led the forensic exercise followed by M/s.Arvind Datar,  Laxmi Kumaran, Ravindra Shrivastava, N. Venkataraman and others vehemently  argued that the “Compensatory Tax Theory” propounded by the Seven Judges  Bench of this Court in Automobile case (supra) had no legal basis or constitutional  sanction and was neither acceptable nor workable. That is particularly so  because the State legislatures had taken umbrage under the “Compensatory Tax 46  

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Theory” and declared the fiscal levies imposed by them to be compensatory in  character and claimed the same to be outside the mischief of Article 301 and  consequently immune from any challenge on the ground that these taxes and  levies were unreasonable restrictions on the right to free trade and commerce.  The States who have enacted the laws providing for levy of taxes on the entry of  goods into a local area within the meaning of Entry 52 of List II have, on the other  hand similarly contended that the Compensatory Tax Theory is bereft of any legal  basis and that the decision in Atiabari and Automobile cases (supra) need to be  revisited to restore and protect the sovereign power of legislation of the States and  the Federal character of our polity. Suffice it to say that except a feeble attempt  made by some Counsel, there has been a general consensus that the  compensatory tax theory deserves to be rejected and the issues examined afresh  on a true and correct interpretation of the relevant constitutional provisions. We  are mentioning all this only to show that even after fifty years and several  illuminating pronouncements of this Court, the cleavage in the judicial opinion as  to the true and correct legal position on the subject continues to loom large and  haunt lawyers and litigants and, if we may say so, even Judges alike. The present  reference to a larger Bench is in that backdrop expected to give a quietus to this  raging legal controversy of considerable complexity, though given the  perseverance of the litigants and the ingenuity of the bar a quietus is only a pious  hope which has and may even in future elude us.  

Constitutional Limitations must be Express:

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  1. The power to levy taxes, being a sovereign power controlled only  by the Constitution, any limitation on that power must be express. That  proposition is well settled by the decisions of this Court in Maharaj Umeg  Singh v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC 540 and Firm Bansidhar  Premsukhdas v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 40. In Umeg Singh’s case  (supra) this Court stated the legal position in the following words: 

“12…….The legislative competence of the State Legislature  can only be circumscribed by express prohibition  contained in the Constitution itself and unless and until  there is any provision in the Constitution expressly  prohibiting legislation on the subject either absolutely or  conditionally, there is no fetter or limitation on the plenary  powers which the State Legislature enjoys to legislate on  the topics enumerated in the Lists II & III of the Seventh  Schedule to the Constitution.  

xxxx xxxx xxxx  

  1. The fetter or limitation upon the legislative power of the  State Legislature which had plenary powers of legislation  within the ambit of the legislative heads specified in the  Lists II & III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution  could only be imposed by the Constitution itself and not by  any obligation which had been undertaken by either the  Dominion Government or the Province of Bombay or even  the State of Bombay. Under Article 246 the State  Legislature was invested with the power to legislate on the  topics enumerated in Lists II & III of the Seventh Schedule to  the Constitution and this power was by virtue of article  245(1) subject to the provisions of the Constitution.  

The Constitution itself laid down the fetters or limitations on  this power, e.g., in Article 303 or article 286(2). But unless  and until the Court came to the conclusion that the Constitution itself had expressly prohibited legislation on the  subject either absolutely or conditionally the power of the 

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State Legislature to enact legislation within its legislative  competence was plenary. Once the topic of legislation  was comprised within any of the entries in the Lists II & III of  the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution the fetter or  limitation on such legislative power had to be found within  the Constitution itself and if there was no such fetter or  limitation to be found there the State Legislature had full  competence to enact the impugned Act no matter  whether such enactment was contrary to the guarantee  given, or the obligation undertaken by the Dominion Government or the Province of Bombay or even the State  of Bombay. 

  1. Again in Bansidhar’s case (supra) this Court reiterated the legal  position in the following words: 

“8… It is well-established that Parliament or the State  Legislatures are competent to enact a law altering the  terms and conditions of a previous contract or of a grant  under which the liability of the Government of India or of  the State Governments arises. The legislative competence  of Parliament or of the State Legislatures can only be  circumscribed by express prohibition contained in the  Constitution itself and unless and until there is any provision  in the Constitution expressly prohibiting legislation on the  subject either absolutely or conditionally, there is no fetter  of limitation on the plenary powers which the Legislature is  endowed with for legislating on the topics enumerated in  the relevant lists. This view is borne out by the decision of  the Judicial Committee in Thakur Jagannath Baksh Singh v.  The United Provinces [1946 FCR 111] in which a similar  complaint was made by the taluqdars of Oudh against the  United Provinces Tenancy Act (U.P. Act 17 of 1939). It was  held by the Judicial Committee that the Crown cannot  deprive itself of its legislative authority by the mere fact  that in the exercise of its prerogative it makes a grant of  land within the territory over which such legislative authority  exists, and no court can annul the enactment of a  legislative body acting within the legitimate scope of its  sovereign competence. If therefore, it be found that the  subject-matter of a Crown grant is within the competence 

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of a Provincial legislature nothing can prevent that  legislature from legislating about it unless the Constitution  Act itself expressly prohibits legislation on the subject either  absolutely or conditionally. Accordingly, in the absence of  any such express prohibition, the United Provinces Tenancy  Act, 1939, which in consolidating and amending the law  relating to agricultural tenancies and other matters  connected therewith in Agra and Oudh, dealt with matters  within the exclusive legislative competence of the  Provincial legislature under Item 21 of List 11 of the Seventh  schedule to the Government of India Act, 1935, was intra  vires the Provincial legislature notwithstanding that  admittedly some of its provisions cut down the absolute  rights claimed by the appellant taluqdar to be comprised  in the grant of his estate as evidenced by the sanad  granted by the Crown to his predecessor. The same  principle has been reiterated by this Court in Maharaj  Umeg Singh and others v. The State of Bombay [1955 2 SCR  164]. It was pointed out that in view of Art. 246 of the  Constitution, no curtailment of legislative competence can  be spelt out of the terms of clause 5 of the Letters of  Guarantee given by the Dominion Government to the  Rulers of “States” subsequent to the agreements of Merger,  which guaranteed, inter alia, the continuance of Jagirs in  the merged ’States’. This principle also underlies the recent  decision of this Court in Maharaja Shree Umaid Mills Ltd. v.  Union of India [1963 Supp 2 SCR 515] in which it was  pointed out that there is nothing in Art. 295 of the  Constitution which prohibits Parliament from enacting a  law altering the terms. and conditions of a contract or of a  grant under which the liability of the Government of India  arises….” (Emphasis Supplied) 

  1. One other fundamental aspect which must always be kept in mind  while interpreting the provisions of the Constitution is the federal  structure envisaged by it. Whether or not the Constitution of India is truly  federal in character has been the subject matter of debate not only in 

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the Constituent Assembly but also in Courts for over 60 years. The  character of the Constitutional scheme described in the Constituent  Assembly Debates was that there were doubts expressed whether the  Constitution really provided a federal structure in the governance of the  country. The criticism was that the scheme underlying the Constitution  was more unitary than federal, on account not only of several provisions  in the Constitution that empowered the Centre to at times intervene  and enact laws for the States but also on account of the Centre’s  power to take over the governance of the State. Repelling that  criticism, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar speaking in the Constituent Assembly  explained the true character of the Constitution of India in the following  significant words: 

“There is only one point of constitutional import to which I  propose to make a reference. A serious complaint is made  on the ground that there is too much of centralisation and  that the States have been reduced to municipalities. It is  clear that this view is not only an exaggeration, but is also  founded on a misunderstanding of what exactly the  Constitution contrives to do. As to the relation between the  Centre and the States, it is necessary to bear in mind the  fundamental principle on which it rests. The basic principle  of federalism is that the legislative and executive authority  is partitioned between the Centre and the States not by  any law to be made by the Centre but by the Constitution  itself. This is what Constitution does. The States under our  Constitution are in no way dependent upon the Centre for  their legislative or executive authority. The Centre and the  States are coequal in this matter. It is difficult to see how  such a Constitution can be called centralism. It may be 

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that the Constitution assigns to the Centre too large a field  for the operation of its legislative and executive authority  than is to be found in any other federal Constitution. It may  be that the residuary powers are given to the Centre and  not to the States. But these features do not form the  essence of federalism. The chief mark of federalism as I  said lies in the partition of the legislative and executive  authority between the Centre and the units by the  Constitution. This is the principle embodied in our Constitution.” 

  1. To the same effect was the answer given to the criticism by Shri T.T.  Krishnamachari during the Constituent Assembly Debates on the draft  Constitution, when he said: 

“Sir, I would like to go into a few fundamental objections  because as I said it would not be right for us to leave these  criticisms uncontroverted. Let me take up a matter which is  perhaps partly theoretical but one which has a validity so  far as the average man in this country is concerned. Are  we framing a unitary Constitution? Is this Constitution  centralising power in Delhi? Is there any way provided by  means of which the position of people in various areas  could be safeguarded, their voices heard in regard to  matters of their local administration? I think it is a very big  charge to make that this Constitution is not a federal  Constitution, and that it is a unitary one. We should not  forget that this question that the Indian Constitution should  be a federal one has been settled by our Leader who is no  more with us, in the Round Table Conference in London  eighteen years back.” 

“I would ask my honourable friend to apply a very simple  test so far as this Constitution is concerned to find out  whether it is federal or not. The simple definition I have got  from the German school of political philosophy is that the  first criterion is that the State must exercise compulsive  power in the enforcement of a given political order, the  second is that these powers must be regularly exercised 

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over all the inhabitants of a given territory, and the third is  the most important and that is that the activity of the State  must not be completely circumscribed by orders handed  down for execution by the superior unit. The important  words are ‘must not be completely circumscribed’, which  envisages some powers of the State are bound to be  circumscribed by the exercise of federal authority. Having  all these factors in view, I will urge that our Constitution is a  federal Constitution. I will urge that our Constitution is one  in which we have given power to the units which are both  substantial and significant in the legislative sphere and in  the executive sphere.” (Emphasis Supplied)  

  1. Whether or not the Constitution provides a federal structure for the  governance of the country has been the subject matter of a long line of  decisions of this Court, reference to all of which may be unnecessary  but the legal position appears to be fairly well settled that the  Constitution provides for a quasi federal character with a strong bias  towards the Centre. The pronouncements recognised the proposition  that even when Constitution may not be strictly federal in its character  as the United States of America, where sovereign States came together  to constitute a federal union, where each State enjoins a privilege of  having a Constitution of its own, the significant feature of a federal  Constitution are found in the Indian Constitution which makes it a quasi  federal Constitution, if not truly federal in character and in stricto sensu federal. The two decisions which stand out in the long line of  pronouncements of this Court on the subject may, at this stage, be 53  

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briefly mentioned. The first of these cases is the celebrated decisions of  this Court in Kesavananda Bharati case (supra), wherein a thirteen  Judges Bench of this Court, Sikri CJ (as His Lordship then was), being one  of them talks about whether the Constitution of India was federal in  character and if so whether federal character of the Constitution  formed the basic feature of the Constitution. Sikri CJ. summed up the  basic feature of the Constitution in the following words: 

“292. … … …The true position is that every provision of the  Constitution can be amended provided in the result the  basic foundation and structure of the Constitution remains  the same. The basic structure may be said to consist of the  following features:  

(1) Supremacy of the Constitution.  

(2) Republican and Democratic form of Government.  

(3) Secular character of the Constitution.  

(4) Separation of powers between the legislature, the executive  and the judiciary;  

(5) Federal character of the Constitution.  

  1. The above structure is built on the basic foundation i.e.  the dignity and freedom of the individual. This is of supreme  importance. This cannot by any form of amendment be  destroyed.  
  2. The above foundation and the above basic features  are easily discernible not only from the preamble but the  whole scheme of the Constitution, which I have already  discussed.”

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To the same effect are the views expressed by Shelat and Grover JJ.  who declared that the federal character of the Constitution is a part of  its basic structure.  

  1. In S.R. Bommai v. Union of India 1994 (3) SCC 1, this Court had yet  another occasion to examine whether the Constitution was federal in  nature. Speaking for himself and Justice Kuldeep Singh, Sawant J. while  referring to H.M Seervai’s commentary on “Constitutional Law of India” 

held that the principle of federalism has not been watered down so as  to make the Constitution unitary in character. The presence in the  Constitution exclusive legislative powers conferred on the State and the  provision that such powers may be exercised by the Parliament during  an emergency may not affect and dilute the federal character of the  Constitution. So also, the provisions of Article 355 imposing the duty on  the Union to protect a State against internal disorder are not  inconsistent with the federal principles nor are the powers vested in the  Central Government under Article 356 inconsistent with the federal  character of the Constitution.  

  

The Court, in particular, dealt with the question whether List II contains  unimportant matters thereby denuding the Constitution of its federal 

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character. The Court observed that List II contains very important  subjects assigned to the State including the power to levy taxes which  powers are made mutually exclusive so that ordinarily the States have  independent source of revenue of their own. The following passages  from the decision are apposite: 

“…….  

97 (k) The view that unimportant matters were assigned to  the States cannot be sustained in face of the very  important subjects assigned to the States in List II, and the  same applies to taxing powers of the States, which are  made mutually exclusive of the taxing powers of the Union  so that ordinarily the States have independent source of  revenue of their own. The legislative entries relating to taxes  in List II show that the sources of revenue available to the  States are substantial and would increasingly become  more substantial. In addition to the exclusive taxing powers  of the States, the States become entitled either to appropriate taxes collected by the Union or to a share in  the taxes collected by the Union. 

  1. The above discussion thus shows that the States have an independent constitutional existence and they have as important a role to play in the political, social, educational  and cultural life of the people as the Union. They are  neither satellites nor agents of the Centre. The fact that  during emergency and in certain other eventualities their  powers are overridden or invaded by the Centre is not  destructive of the essential federal nature of our  Constitution. The invasion of power in such circumstances is  not a normal feature of the Constitution. They are  exceptions and have to be resorted to only occasionally to  meet the exigencies of the special situations. The  exceptions are not a rule.  
  2. For our purpose, further it is really not necessary to  determine whether, in spite of the provisions of the  Constitution referred to above, our Constitution is federal, 

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quasi-federal or unitary in nature. It is not the theoretical  label given to the Constitution but the practical  implications of the provisions of the Constitution which are  of importance to decide the question that arises in the  present context, viz., whether the powers under Article  356(1) can be exercised by the President arbitrarily and  unmindful of its consequences to the governance in the  State concerned. So long as the States are not mere administrative units but in their own right constitutional  potentates with the same paraphernalia as the Union, and  with independent Legislature and the Executive  constituted by the same process as the Union, whatever  the bias in favour of the Centre, it cannot be argued that  merely because (and assuming it is correct) the  Constitution is labelled unitary or quasi-federal or a mixture  of federal and unitary structure, the President has unrestricted power of issuing Proclamation under Article  356(1). If the Presidential powers under the said provision  are subject to judicial review within the limits discussed  above, those limitations will have to be applied strictly  while scrutinising the concerned material.” 

(Emphasis Supplied) 

  1. What is important is that B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. speaking for himself  and Aggarwal J., while holding the Constitution to be federal in  character cautioned that the Centre cannot tamper with the powers  conferred upon the States. States are not mere appendages of the  Centre within the sphere allotted to them. The States are supreme and  the Centre cannot tamper with their powers.  
  2. Justice K. Ramaswamy, speaking for himself also accepted  federalism of the Indian Constitution as a basic feature. One other  decision that has dealt with the federal character of the Constitution of 57  

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India is Kuldeep Nair v. Union of India and Ors. (2006) 7 SCC 1 wherein  this Court held that nature of federalism in the Indian Constitution is no  longer res integra. Relying upon the Constituent Assembly Debates to  which we have referred earlier. The Court declared: 

“50. A lot of energy has been devoted on behalf of the  petitioners to build up a case that the Constitution of India  is federal. The nature of federalism in the Indian  Constitution is no longer res integra.  

  1. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the  Indian model is broadly based on federal form of  governance. Answering the criticism of the tilt towards the  Centre, Shri T.T. Krishnamachari, during debates in the  Constituent Assembly on the draft Constitution, had stated  as follows:  

……….”  

  1. While parting with this aspect we must also refer to the decision of  this Court in Re: Under Article 143, Constitution of India (Special  Reference No.1 of 1964) AIR 1965 SC 745 wherein this Court held: 

“39. In dealing with this question, it is necessary to bear in  mind one fundamental feature of a Federal Constitution. In  England, Parliament is sovereign; and in the words of  Dicey, the three distinguishing features of the principle of  Parliamentary Sovereignty are that Parliament has the right  to make or unmake any law whatever; that no person or  body is recognised by the law of England as having a right  to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament, and  that the right or power of Parliament extends to every part  of the Queen’s dominions (1). On the other hand, the  essential characteristic of federalism is “the distribution of  limited executive, legislative and judicial authority among  bodies which are coordinate with and independent of each other”. The supremacy of the constitution is 

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fundamental to the existence of a federal State in order to  prevent either the legislature of the federal unit or those of  the member States from destroying or impairing that delicate balance of power which satisfies the particular  requirements of States which are desirous of union, but not  prepared to merge their individuality in a unity. This  supremacy of the constitution is protected by the authority  of an independent judicial body to act as the interpreter of  a scheme of distribution of powers. Nor is any change  possible in the Constitution by the ordinary process of  federal or State legislation (2). Thus the dominant 

characteristic of the British Constitution cannot be claimed  by a Federal Constitution like ours.” 

  1. Before we turn to the provisions of Articles 301 to 307 comprising  Part XIII of the Constitution, we need to also bear in mind the historical  backdrop in which that part of the Constitution was enacted. While  doing so we must at the threshold acknowledge that the historical  perspective of Part XIII has been explored several times during the past  in several pronouncements of this Court. The exposition of different  stages of evolution and development of what comprises Part XIII today  has been both extensive as well as incisive. The decisions of the Court  have gone into great details while examining the history of Part XIII. It  will, therefore, be presumptuous for us to suggest that the historical basis  of Part XIII is a virgin area being traversed for the first time. In fairness to  the scholarly pronouncements that have preceded the present batch  of cases, we must acknowledge with gratitude the usefulness of the in-

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depth study and understanding of the Judges who have examined and  traced the evolution of Part XIII while drawing their conclusions from the  same, no matter such inferences and conclusions have more often than  not been varied which is but natural when one examines history or the  events that led to its making.  

  1. It is, in our opinion, unnecessary to refer to all the decisions that  have till now traced the development of the jurisprudence concerning  Part XIII from its inception. A reference to some of the decisions alone  should, in our opinion, suffice. The first of these decisions to which we  must make a reference is the Constitution Bench decision in M.P.V.  Sunderaramier v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1958 SC 468. That was a  case filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India for a Writ of  Prohibition restraining the State of Andhra Pradesh from imposing a tax  on inter-State trade of sale and purchase of yarn. The levy and  collection of any such tax was according to the petitioner contrary to  the provision contained in Article 282 (6) of the Constitution of India.  One of the questions that fell for consideration of the Court was whether  the States could impose a tax on inter-State sales having regard to the  provisions of Articles 246 and 301 of the Constitution of India. The  argument was that the freedom guaranteed under Article 301 included 60  

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freedom from taxation with the result that any tax on inter-State sales  would offend that guarantee. The contention was rejected by this  Court in unequivocal terms. The Court said : 

“(50) This contention suffers, in our opinion, from serious  infirmities. It overlooks that our Constitution was not written  on a tabula-rasa, that a Federal Constitution had been  established under the Government of India Act, 1935, and  though that has undergone considerable change by way  of repeal, modification and addition, it still remains the  framework on which the present Constitution is built, and  that the provisions of the Constitution must accordingly be  read in the light of the provisions of the Government of  India Act.”  

 (Emphasis supplied) 

  1. Three years later came the Constitution Bench decision of this  Court in Atiabari Tea Company Ltd. case (supra). The petitioner in that  case questioned the constitutional validity of Assam Taxation (on Goods  Carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act, (Assam Act XIII of 1954),  before the High Court. The Writ Petition having failed, the matter was  brought up in appeal before this Court which was heard alongwith  several petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The  impugned legislation levied taxes on certain goods carried by road and  inland waterways in the State of Assam. The levy under the legislation  was challenged primarily on the ground that the same was ultra vires of  the Constitution inter aila because of their repugnance with the 

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provision of Article 301 of the Constitution. This Court by a majority struck  down the Constitutional validity of the enactment holding that the  impugned levy operated directly and immediately as a restriction on  free trade, commerce and intercourse guaranteed under Article 301 of  the Constitution of India. The decision propounded three different  points of view, one each taken by B.P. Sinha, CJ. and J.C. Shah, J. and  the third by majority comprising P.B. Gajendragadkar, K.N. Wanchoo  and K.C. Das Gupta, JJ. We shall presently deal with the rationale  underlying the three views but before we do so, we may gainfully  extract from the decision rendered by Sinha, CJ., the historical  perspective in which Part XIII of the Constitution was enacted. In Para 9  of the Report, Sinha, CJ., as His Lordship then was, traced the evolution  of Part XIII in the following words: 

“9. In order to fully appreciate the implications of the  provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution, it is necessary to  bear in mind the history and background of those  provisions. The Constitution Act of 1935 (Government of  India Act, 26 (‘Geo. 5, Ch. 2) which envisages the federal  constitution for the whole of India, including what was then  Indian India in contradistinction to British India, which could  not be fully implemented and which also introduced full  provincial autonomy enacted Section 297 prohibiting  certain restrictions on internal trade in these terms:  

  1. (1) No Provincial Legislature or Government shall –  

(a) By virtue of the entry in the Provincial Legislative List  relating to trade and commerce within the Province, or the 

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entry in that list relating to the production, supply, and  distribution of commodities, have power to pass any law or  take any executive action prohibiting or restricting the  entry into, or export from the Province of goods of any  class or description; or  

(b) By virtue of anything in this Act have power to impose  any tax, cess, toll or due which, as between goods  manufactured or produced in the Province and similar  goods not so manufactured or produced, discriminates in  favour of the former, or which, in the case of goods  manufactured or produced outside the Province,  discriminates between goods manufactured or produced  in one locality and similar goods manufactured or  produced in another locality.  

(2) Any law passed in contravention of this section shall, to  the extent of the contravention, be invalid.”  

  1. It will be noticed that the prohibition contained in the  section quoted above applied only to Provincial  Governments and Provincial Legislatures with reference to  entries in the Provincial Legislative List relating to trade and  commerce within the Province and to production, supply  and distribution of commodities. That section dealt with prohibitions or restrictions in respect of import into or export from a Province, of goods generally. It also dealt with the  power to impose taxes etc. and prohibited discrimination  against goods manufactured or produced outside a  Province or goods produced in different localities. Part XIII  of the Constitution has introduced all those prohibitions, not  only in respect of State Legislatures, but of Parliament also. ….  
  2. In this connection it has got to be remembered that  before the commencement of the Constitution about two thirds of India was directly under British rule and was called  ‘British India’ and the remaining about one-third was being  directly ruled by the Princes and was known as “Native  States”. There were a large number of them with varying  degrees of sovereignty vested in them. Those rulers had,  broadly speaking, the trappings of a Sovereign State with  power to impose taxes and to regulate the flow of trade, 

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commerce and intercourse. It is a notorious fact that many  of them had erected trade barriers seriously impeding the  free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse, not only  shutting out but also shutting in commodities meant for  mass consumption. Between the years 1947 and 1950  almost all the Indian States entered into engagements with  the Government of India and ultimately merged their individualities into India as one political unit, with the result  that what was called British India, broadly speaking,  became, under the Constitution, Part A States, and subject  to certain exceptions not relevant to our purpose, the  Native States became Part B States. We also know that  before the Constitution introduced the categories of Part A  States, Part B States and Part C States (excluding Part D  relating to other territories), Part B States themselves, before  their being constituted into so many units, contained many  small States, which formed themselves into Unions of a  number of States, and had such trade barriers and custom  posts, even inter se. But even after the merger, the  Constitution had to take notice of the existence of trade  barriers and therefore had to make transitional provisions  with the ultimate objective of abolishing them all. Most of  those Native States, big or small, had their own taxes,  cesses, tolls and other imposts and duties meant not only  for raising revenue, but also as trade barriers and tariff  walls. It was in the background of these facts and  circumstances that the Constitution by Article 301 provided  for the abolition of all those trade barriers and tariff walls.  When for the first time in the history of India the entire  territory within the geographical boundaries of India, minus  what became Pakistan, was knit into one political unit, it  was necessary to abolish all those trade barriers and  custom posts in the interest of national solidarity, economic  and cultural unity as also of freedom of trade, commerce  and intercourse.”  

(Emphasis supplied) 

  1. The majority opinion offered by Gajendragadkar J., also traced the  history of Part XIII in the following words:  

“33. Let us first recall the political and constitutional  background of Part XIII. It is a matter of common 

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knowledge that, before the Constitution was adopted,  nearly two-thirds of the territory of India was subject to  British Rule and was then known as British India, while the  remaining part of the territory of India was governed by  Indian Princes and it consisted of several Indian States. A  large number of these States claimed sovereign rights  within the limitations imposed by the paramount power in  that behalf, and they purported to exercise their legislative  power of imposing taxes in respect of trade and  commerce which inevitably led to the erection of customs  barriers between themselves and the rest of India. In the  matter of such barriers British India was governed by the  provisions of Section 297 of the Constitution Act, 1935. To  the provisions of this section we will have occasion later to  refer during the course of this judgment. Thus, prior to 1950  the flow of trade and commerce was impeded at several  points which constituted the boundaries of Indian States.  After India attained political freedom in 1947 and before  the Constitution was adopted the historical process of the  merger and integration of the several Indian States with the  rest of the country was speedily accomplished with the  result that when the Constitution was first passed the  territories of India consisted of Part A States which broadly  stated represented the provinces in British India, and Part B  States which were made up of Indian States. This merger or  integration of Indian States with the Union of India was  preceded by the merger and consolidation of some of the  States inter-se between themselves. It is with the  knowledge of the trade barriers which had been raised by  the Indian States in exercise of their legislative powers that  the Constitution- makers framed the Articles in Part XIII. The  main object of Article 301 obviously was to allow the free  flow of the stream of trade, commerce and intercourse  throughout the territory of India.” 

  1. Then came the decision of this Court in Automobile case (supra)  wherein, this Court examined the challenge to the Rajasthan Motor  Vehicles Act, inter aila, on the ground that levy of taxes imposed under 

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the said Act were offensive to Article 301 of the Constitution of India.  S.K. Das, J. speaking for the majority also traced the historical  background of Part XIII in the following words: 

“7. So far we have set out the factual and legal  background against which the problem before us has to  be solved. We must now say a few words regarding the  historical background. It is necessary to do this, because  extensive references have been made to Australian and  American decisions, Australian decisions with regard to the  interpretation of Section 92 of the Australian Constitution  and American decisions with regard to the Commerce  clause of the American Constitution. This Court pointed out  in the Atiabari Tea Co. case (1961) 1 SCR 809 : (AIR 1961 SC  232), that it would not be always safe to rely upon the  American or Australian decisions in interpreting the  provisions of our Constitution. Valuable as those decisions  might be in showing how the problem of freedom of trade,  commerce and intercourse was dealt with in other federal  constitutions, the provisions of our Constitution must be  interpreted against the historical background in which our  Constitution was made; the background of problems  which the Constitution-makers tried to solve according to  the genius of the Indian people whom the Constitution makers represented in the Constituent Assembly. The first  thing to be noticed in this connection is that the  Constitution-makers were not writing on a clean slate. They  had the Government of India Act, 1935 and they also had  the administrative set up which that Act envisaged. India  then consisted of various administrative units known as  Provinces, each with its own administrative set up. There  were differences of language, religion etc. Some of the  Provinces were economically more developed than the others. Even inside the same Province, there were under  developed, developed and highly developed areas from  the point of view of industries, communications etc. The  problem of economic integration with which the  Constitution-makers were faced was a problem with many  facets. Two questions, however, stood out; one question  was how to achieve a federal, economic and fiscal  integration, so that economic policies affecting the 

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interests of India as a whole could be carried out without  putting an ever-increasing strain on the unity of India,  particularly in the context of a developing economy. The  second question was how to foster the development of  areas which were under-developed without creating too  many preferential or discriminative barriers. Besides the  Provinces, there were the Indian States also known as  Indian India. After India attained political freedom in 1947  and before the Constitution was adopted, the process of  merger and integration of the- Indian States with the rest of  the country had been accomplished so that when the  Constitution was first passed the territory of India consisted  of Part A States, which broadly stated, represented the  Provinces in British India, and Part B States which were  made up of Indian States. There were trade barriers raised  by the Indian States in the exercise of their legislative  powers and the Constitution-makers had to make  provisions with regard to those trade barriers as well. The  evolution of a federal structure or a quasi-federal structure  necessarily involved, in the context of the conditions then  prevailing, a distribution of powers and a basic part of our  Constitution relates to that distribution with the three  legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule. … … …”  

  1. Hidayatullah J., in a separate dissenting opinion traced at great  length the historical evolution of not only the federal structure of the  Government of India Act, 1915 but also the recommendations made by  the Simon Commission and the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the  Evolution of such Federalism and for the protection of trade, commerce  and intercourse. His Lordship referred to the backdrop in which the  Government of India Act, 1935 was enacted, including the  recommendations made by the Butler Committee, the Round Table  Conference, the Federal Structure Committee, the Federal Legislature 67  

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and Provincial Legislature Committee and the Joint Parliamentary  Committee to eventually conclude that the avowed object underlying  all these recommendations and constitutional framework was to ensure  that the accession of the State to the federation implies its acceptance  of the principle that it will not set up a barrier to free interchange so  formidable as to constitute a threat to the future of the federation.  Based on the historical developments decades before the enactment  of Government of India Act, 1935, his Lordship concluded: 

“95. The detailed examination of the history lying at the  back of the Government of India Act, 1935 lays bare some  fundamental facts and premises. It shows that the process  through a whole century was the breakup of a highly 

centralized Government and the creation of autonomous  Provinces with distinct and separate political existence, to  be combined inter se and with the Indian States, at a later  period, in a federation. To achieve this, not only was there  a division of the heads of legislation, but the financial  resources were also divided and separate fiscs for the  federation and the Provinces were established. The fields  of taxation were demarcated, and those for the Provinces  were chosen with special care to make these units self 

supporting as far as possible with enough to spare for  “nation-building activities”. In this arrangement, the door  was open for the Indian States to join on the same basis  and on terms of equality. The most important fact was that  unlike the American and the Canadian Constitutions the  commerce power was divided between the Centre and  the Provinces as the Entries quoted by us clearly show. The  commerce power of the Provinces was exercisable within  the Provinces. The fetter on the commercial power of the  Provinces was placed by Section 297. This was in two  directions. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) banned restrictions  at the barriers of the Provinces on the entry and export of  goods, and clause (b) prohibited discrimination in taxing 

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goods between goods manufactured and produced in  the Province as against goods not so manufactured or  produced and local discriminations.” 

(Emphasis supplied) 

  1. In the opinion of Hidayatullah J., as his Lordship then was, several  pitfalls existed in the 1935 Act regarding trade and commerce which  were sought to be remedied by the framers of the Constitution while  maintaining its federal structure. The following passage is, in this regard,  instructive:  

96. When drafting the Constitution of India, the  Constituent Assembly being aware of the problems in various countries where freedom of trade, commerce and  intercourse has been provided differently and also the way  the Courts of those countries have viewed the relative  provisions, must have attempted to evolve a pattern of  such freedom suitable to Indian conditions. The Constituent  Assembly realised that the provisions of Section 297 and  the Chapter on Discriminations in the Government of India  Act, 1935 hardly met the case, and were inadequate. They  had to decide the following questions: (a) whether to give  the commerce power only to Parliament or to divide it  between Parliament and the State Legislatures; (b)  whether to ensure freedom of trade, commerce and  intercourse inter-State, that is to say, at the borders of the  States or to ensure it even intra-State; (c) whether to make  the prohibition against restrictions absolute or qualified,  and if so, in what manner; (d) if qualified, by whom was the  restriction to be imposed and to what extent; (e) whether  the freedom should be to the individual or also to trade  and commerce as a whole; (f) what to do with the existing  laws in British India and more so, in the acceding Indian  States; (g) whether any special provisions were needed for  emergencies; (h) what should be the special provisions to  enable the States to levy taxes on sale of goods, which 

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taxes were to be the main source of income for the States  according to the experts. All these matters have, in fact,  been covered in Part XIII, and the pitfalls which were  disclosed in the Law Reports of the Countries which had  accepted freedom of trade and commerce have been  attempted to be avoided by choosing language  appropriate for the purpose. In addition to this, the broad  pattern of the political set-up, namely, a federation of  autonomous States was not lost sight of. These autonomous  conditions had strengthened during the operation of the  1935 Constitution and led to what Prof. Coupland  described as “Provincial-patriotism”, for which the reason,  according to the learned Professor was:  

“In the course of the last few years, moreover, the sense of  Provincial patriotism has been strengthened by the advent  of a full Provincial self-government. The people took a new  pride in Governments that were now in a sense theirs.” (The  Constitutional Problem in India, part III p. 40).” 

  1. The historical backdrop painted by the decisions of this Court  referred to above has not been challenged on a question of fact.  Inferences drawn from the same may have, as noticed earlier, varied  depending on the individual perspective of the Judges about the said  backdrop. The common thread that runs through the historical  narratives in the pronouncements of this Court however is discernible  and may be briefly summed-up at this stage. The first of these threads  that runs through the historical perspective is the fact that before  commencement of the Constitution nearly 2/3rd of the country was  ruled by the British while the remaining 1/3rd was ruled by the Princes 

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also known as native States that enjoyed varying degrees of  sovereignty over their respective territories. These rulers had the power  to impose taxes and to regulate the flow of trade, commerce and  intercourse. Some of them had erected trade barriers thereby  impeding free flow of trade, commerce and intercourse. With the  merger of these Princely States into the dominion of India to constitute  one single political entity, that part of the country that was ruled by the  British came to be known as Part-A State while the native States  became Part B States. What is significant is that even after the merger  of these States, the Constitution had to acknowledge the existence of  trade barriers and make transitional provisions with a view to eventually  abolishing the same. It was in that background that the Constitution by  Article 301 provided for the abolition of all such trade barriers  consequent upon the entire geographical boundaries of India being  knit into one political unit. The whole object underlying the removal of  such barriers was to facilitate free trade, commerce and intercourse in  the interest of national solidarity and economic unity of the country.  The evolution of Articles 301 to 307 comprising Part XIII of the  Constitution is also punctuated by several events, twists and turns to  which we may briefly refer at this stage, but, while we may do so, we 

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need to remember that Section 297 of the Government of India Act,  1935 dealt with the subject that eventually came under the umbrella of  Part XIII and prohibited provincial governments from imposing barriers  on trade within the country. The said provision also prohibited levy of  cess, tolls or other tax duties which discriminated between the goods  manufactured in one locality as against similar goods manufactured  elsewhere. It is because of the said provision that Venkatarama Iyer, J.  in MPV Sunderaramier’s case (supra) made the observation that the  Constitution was not written on a tabula rasa.  

  1. The first germ plasma for Article 301 was located in what was  introduced as Clause 13 in the draft submitted by the Sub-Committee  on fundamental rights comprising Mr. K.M. Munshi, Sir Alladi  Krishnaswami Ayyar and Sir B.N. Rau amongst others. The clause was in  the following words:  

Subject to regulation by the law of the Union, trade,  commerce and intercourse among the units, whether by  means of internal carriage or by ocean navigation, shall be  free:  

 Provided that any unit may by law impose reasonable  restrictions thereon in the interest of public order, morality or  health.”

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From the note of Sir B.N. Rau it is evident that the first part of clause 13  (supra) was adopted from Section 92 of the Australian Constitution  while the proviso at the end of the clause was new. 

  1. Sir Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar in the Draft Report of 10th, 14th and  15th April, 1947 in relation to Clause 13 suggested that it must be made  clear that:  

“(1) goods from other parts of India than in the units’  concerned coming into the units cannot escape duties  and taxes to which the goods produced in the units in  themselves are subject.  

 (2) It must also be open to the unit in an emergency to  place restrictions on the rights declared by the clause.”  

  1. The above suggestions were accepted and it was modified and  incorporated as Clause 14 in the following words: 

“14. (1) Subject to regulation by the law of the Union  trade, commerce and intercourse among the units by and  between the citizens shall be free:  

 Provided that any unit may by law impose reasonable  restrictions in the interest of public order, morality or health  or in an emergency:  

 Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent any unit  from imposing on goods imported from other units the  same duties and taxes to which the goods produced in the  unit are subject: 

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 Provided further that no preference shall be given by any  regulation of commerce or revenue by a unit to one unit  over another.  

 [N.B. – A proviso will have to be added to meet the  difficulty pointed out in para 6 of our report.]  

 (2) Trade, commerce or intercourse within the territories of  the Union by or with any person other than the citizens shall  be regulated and controlled by the law of the Union.  

  1. The above clause then came up for consideration before the  Advisory Committee where an elaborate debate ensued. What is of  considerable importance is the statement of Sir Alladi Krishnaswami  Ayyar where he explained the purpose of enabling a State to impose  reasonable restriction in the interest of public order, morality, health or  in an emergency:  

 “Chairman: Then let us take up clause 14  

  1. Rajagopalachari: I Think we should add to 14 (1) that this shall not be a bar to the imposition of taxes for genuine

purposes of revenue

Many Members: That comes later on: “N.B. A proviso will  

have to be added to meet the difficulty pointed out in para  6 of our report.” 

  1. Rajagopalachari: That is why I am adding it.  

Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar: “Subject to regulation by the  

law of the Union, trade, commerce, and intercourse among  the units by and between the citizens shall be free.” That is  the general principle. Then come the exceptions,  

“Provided that any unit may by law impose reasonable  

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or in an emergency.” Suppose there is a general famine,  and people are starved, that is what is meant here to be  dealt with. 

And then “Provided that nothing in this section shall prevent  any unit from imposing on goods imported from other units  the same duties and taxes to which the goods produced in  the unit are subject.” That is to say, we ought not to  differentiate; but at the same time, goods coming in should  not go scot-free; they should be subject to the same duty  as goods produced in the area.  

And then “Provided further that no preference shall be  given by any regulation of commerce or revenue by a unit  to one unit over another.” Now, kindly read paragraph 6 of  the report, regarding adding a proviso.  

K.M. Panikkar: Rajaji (C. Rajagopalachari) has raised the  question of the right of the units to raise taxes, and says this  right should not be denied. I, however, think this is a  dangerous power to be given to the units. This may result in  the creation of so many competing units. We have allowed  for two things. We have allowed the unit to tax its own  industries. We also allow things brought in to be taxed, for  the sake of parity. But our friends want to go a little further  and say that the right to impose taxes, or transit duty or  some other kind of duty must be given to the units. That I  am afraid, will be a negation of the clause. There are  certain rates and duties existing in Indian States which for  budgetary and other reasons cannot now be extinguished  immediately. It may be possible to extinguish them over a  period of time, by agreement, but not immediately. 

  1. Rajagopalachari: If the States everywhere can impose  taxes and duties for revenue, cannot the provinces also do  so? 

Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar: We do not give a carte blanche  to the States. It has been pointed out that certain condition  of things obtain at present in the States, and … 

K.M. Panikkar: Let me explain the position. The position  with regard to the internal customs in the States is 

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complicated. In a large number of States these customs or  duties do not exist. For example for the whole of the Punjab  States there is no right for internal customs. For Hyderabad  they have the right to impose a tax up to 5% only, both on  imports and exports. In Travancore and Cochin it is  governed by what is called inter-portal convention. A large  number of States have no right whatever even now for  imposing customs duty, but a considerable number of them  do enjoy this power and their budgetary position today is  based on the customs duties they receive, both the  maritime States and the internal States. Therefore 

arrangements will have to be made with them by  agreement and contract for setting this matter. 

Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar: The Union Powers Committee’s  attention was drawn to this matter and it was suggested by  Sir V.T. Krishnamachari and Sir B.L. Mitter that some  reference should be made to it in their report. We wanted  to permit the States to enjoy the indulgence they have  been enjoying. But we should guard against converting the  country into competing units; that will be against the  federation idea. 

Chairman: What shall we do about the note? A proviso will  have to be added to meet the difficulty pointed out in para  6 of the report. Shall we leave it as it is or shall we draft it? 

  1. Rajagopalachari: I would request members who have  given thought to this subject to please inform me how the  units will raise their revenue. As it is, the Union does not  contemplate the distribution of subsidies to the provinces.  The provinces or groups differ among themselves, some are  rich and some are poor. Some are capable of managing  with their existing resources; but others may have to  increase their revenue for managing their affairs. If you  impose so many limitations on them, how can they do that?  It is all very well to say free trade is necessary; but how are  the provinces to live? 

Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar: So far as the provincial  legislatures are concerned, there is provision in Sec. 297 of  the present Government of India Act itself: (Reads) “No  Provincial Legislature or Government shall by virtue of entry 

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*** have power to pass any law or take any executive  

action ***description…” 

  1. Rajagopalachari: But at present we have the receipts  

from customs and other receipts. 

Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar: The other day the Madras  Premier said he could stop the import of textiles from  Bombay and other places outside Madras: but it was  pointed out to him that until the constitution is altered he  cannot do so. This theory of self-sufficiency of different units  is dangerous in our country, because we have to depend  upon one another.  

Govind Ballabh Pant: There is unanimity about the body of  this clause and it is clear that there should not be any  discrimination against one unit by another unit. Otherwise  we will be going against the very sense of a Union or a  Federal Constitution. If the units are to be discriminated  against, we will come to blows more often than otherwise.  Therefore this should be avoided. The only thing to be  considered is how to give effect to the suggestion made in  para 6 of the President’s letter which we have received  through the chairman. Should we append a note to the  effect that the Constituent Assembly may consider how  best to give effect to this clause in relation to the States or  shall we put up a draft. If we are not going to put up a  draft, then the matter is simple enough.”  

  1. The Advisory Committee accepted the recommendation of the  Sub-Committee in relation to Clause 14 with one change that the sub clause providing for central regulation of trade by or with non-citizens  was dropped as being vague and unnecessary. The Advisory  Committee in its report submitted on 23rd April, 1947 incorporated the  above provision as Clause 10. Certain amendments to the said clause  

were suggested and adopted by the Constituent Assembly. 77  

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  1. In the first Draft Constitution of October, 1947, Clause 17  underwent further amendments and eventually appeared in the Draft  Constitution of 1948 as Clause 16 incorporated in the Fundamental  Rights Chapter in the following words:  

“16. Subject to the provisions of Article 244 of this  Constitution and of any law made by Parliament, trade,  commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India  shall be free.” 

  1. It is noteworthy to mention here that Inter-State trade and  commerce was dealt with in Articles 243, 244 and 245 in the Draft  Constitution of 1948 which Articles were in the following terms:  

“243. No preference shall be given to one State over  another nor shall any discrimination be made between  one State and another by any law or regulation relating to  trade or commerce, whether carried by land, water or air.  

  1. Notwithstanding anything contained in article 16 or in  the last preceding article of this Constitution, it shall be  lawful for any State –  

(a) to impose on good imported from other  

States any tax to which similar goods  

manufactured or produced in that State  

are subject, so, however, as not to  

discriminate between goods so imported  

and goods so manufactured or  

produced; and  

(b) to impose by land such reasonable  

restrictions on the freedom of trade, 

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commerce or intercourse with that State  

as may be required in the public interests:  

Provided that during a period of five years  

from the commencement of this  

Constitution the provisions of clause (b) of  

this article shall not apply to trade or  

commerce in any of the commodities  

mentioned in clause (a) of Article 306 of  

this Constitution.  

  1. Parliament shall by law appoint such authority as it  considers appropriate for the carrying out of the provisions  of Articles 243 and 244 of this Constitution and confer on  the authority so appointed such powers and such duties as  it thinks necessary.”  
  2. The Ministry of Industry and Supply expressed some reservation  regarding clause (b) of Article 244 and demanded abolition of the said  clause altogether. The Ministry appears to have argued that it was not  possible to foresee the circumstances in which the freedom of trade,  commerce or intercourse with a State will need to be interfered with by  that State in the public interest, unless it be on the basis of  discrimination between the residents of one State to another, and this  would be wholly contrary to the spirit of the Constitution. [See: B. Shiva  Rao; the Framing of India’s Constitution, Volume-IV, Page 329]  
  3. The note in support of the proposed clause (b) to Article 244,  however, clearly suggests that restrictions referred to in clause (b) were 

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meant to be restrictions other than by way of taxation. The explanatory  note which was appended by Sir B.N. Rau was in the following words:  

“Note: During a period of depression owing to destruction  by flood or otherwise of crops in any particular State, it  may be necessary for the State to impose restrictions on  the export of any crop from such State in the public  interests. Similarly on the outbreak of any epidemic  disease, like plague, in a State it may be necessary for a  neighbouring State to impose restrictions on the freedom  of intercourse between the inhabitants of that State with  the inhabitants of such neighbouring State. Clause (b) of  Article 244 is intended to give power to the State to impose  such restrictions.”  

  

  1. On 8th of September, 1949, Dr. B.R. Ambedkar moved an  amendment seeking to delete Articles 243, 244 and 245 and the same  was adopted. Simultaneously, a new Part XA was introduced  containing draft Article 274-A to E. Dr. Ambedkar informed the House  that the Articles that were otherwise scattered were now brought  together so as to ensure that members could get a holistic idea  regarding trade and commerce. Article 274-A was a repetition of  Article 16 and laid down the general principle. Article 274-B  empowered Parliament to impose restrictions in public interest. Article  274-C prohibited Parliament and the State legislatures from making any  law giving any preference to one State over another, or making any 

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