As a result, the investigating agencies must focus more narrowly on bringing individual prosecutions, relying less on internal investigations of the companies for evidence generation and crafting more effective structural-reform requirements. However, this is a restricted strategy and this methodological point is unlikely to gain results if government agencies are unwilling of prosecuting white-collar crimes. The comparatively rapid political Will of multibillion-rupees settlements reached through the traditional “cooperative” channels may be too attractive to pass up for administrations with a democratic mandate to address the problem of corporate wrongdoing.
A more structural approach would be a legislative reform imposing binding procedural procedures and substantial judicial scrutiny. It would re-establish the separation of powers in corporate criminal law, protect the defendants from investigational pressure methods, and oblige investigating agencies to gather evidence against specific persons as a condition of a business settlement as well as to develop more effective structural-reform mandates.
In the end, these issues are pathological repercussions of our excessively concentrated political economy, and the investigation and the governmental agencies have limited capacity to remedy them. However, as long as some organizations are treated too big to prosecute, the government should not rely solely on corporate penalties/settlements to curb their criminal behavior.